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Abstract
Contemporary transgender politics in North America are presently at an impasse 
regarding the meaning of the label that ostensibly unifies this movement. This project 
will examine the terminological debate that has come to dominate transgender 
scholarship and activism, arguing that this concentration has reduced the socio-political 
viability of gender variant individuals to a matter of definition. Drawing on transgender 
and queer theory, as well as psychoanalytic theories of abjection, this thesis aims to 
demonstrate that the issue of viability is grounded not in terminology, but in cultural 
perceptions of ontology that must be resignified to establish gender variance as a 
plausible expression of subjectivity. The efforts of transgender rights activists to 
reconceptualize “the human” in legal terms will be positioned as a potential way through 
which to achieve this paradigmatic change.
Keywords: Sex, Gender, Gender Variance, Transgender, Transsexual, Queer, 
Terminology, Abjection, Ontology, Subjectivity, Human Rights, Activism, Identity, 
Politics, Binarism, Erasure, Exclusion, Dehumanization, Resignification, Pathologization
m
Hearken unto me, fellow creatures. I  who have dwelt in a form unmatched with my 
desire, I  whose flesh has become an assemblage o f incongruous anatomical parts, I  who 
achieve the similitude o f a natural body only through an unnatural process, I  offer you 
this warning: the Nature you bedevil me with is a lie. Do not trust it to protect you from 
what I  represent, for it is a fabrication that cloaks the groundlessness o f the privilege you 
seek to maintain for yourself at my expense. You are as constructed as me; the same 
anarchic womb has birthed us both. I  call upon you to investigate your nature as I  have 
been compelled to confront mine. I  challenge you to risk abjection and flourish as well as 
have I. Heed my words, and you may well discover the seams and sutures in yourself.
(Susan Stryker, “Frankenstein” 240 -  241)
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Although the social and political viability of gender variant individuals has been 
prohibited by normative conceptions of Western subjectivity, transgender politics have 
bound this concern to the ongoing debate regarding the meaning and political orientation 
of the label that ostensibly represents these persons. Presently, “transgender” is 
understood as an “umbrella term,” and can signal various interpretations that concurrently 
unify or segregate different identities, practices, and expressions according to the context 
in which this word is used. As Chapter One demonstrates, this variability and 
contingency compromises the cultural currency of this label, indicating that 
“transgender” cannot politically instantiate the multitude of individuals subsumed by this 
term; however, this thesis argues that the problem of viability extends beyond this 
terminological dilemma, as gender variance as a particular mode of being has been
established as an ontological impossibility.
• \
According to the cultural terms of subjectivity, nonnormative gender is located
outside the bounds of intelligible personhood, which indicates that these expressions and
\
identities are unrecognizable to hegemonic conceptions of “the human.” Consequently, 
gender variance cannot be established as a viable mode of being until this issue is 
addressed; yet, as Chapter One makes clear, this problem continues to be overshadowed 
by the concentration on “transgender” and how this term contests or reifies political 
notions of identity. Though this debate has elucidated the complications posed by this 
latter concept and its importance to state recognition, Vivian Namaste notes that “limiting 
ourselves to [a] discussion] [of] identity can foreclose an understanding of what’s really 
going on” (Sex Change 31). By establishing terminology and its relation to identity as the
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focus of this movement, transgender politics have neglected a deeper investigation into 
why gender variance is presently unviable, which obscures the underlying cause of this 
dilemma and hinders the emergence of plausible solutions. Though Namaste frames her 
critique through the context of an institutional analysis, this project argues that it is the 
premise of human ontology that invalidates gender variance as a mode of being, and that 
this paradigm must consequently be resignified to establish nonnormative gender as an 
intelligible expression of subjectivity.
To demonstrate that the problem of viability is an ontological concern, Chapter 
Two takes up the claim that the process of gender attribution is the primary foundation 
through which human subjectivity is made possible. Because this process is embedded in 
the binary logic of the sex/gender paradigm, gender variance is subsequently excluded 
from the realm of the culturally intelligible, indicating that gender diversity is an unviable 
mode of being. Consequently, gender variant individuals cannot be recognized as 
subjects without undermining the ideology that grounds subjectivity. In fact, as Chapter
Two will illustrate, the exclusion of nonnormative gender from this ontological paradigm
\
is requisite to the construction of normative subjectivity. Drawing on psychoanalytic 
theories of abjection, the cultural abnegation of gender variance will be situated as the 
necessary precondition of subject formation within the symbolic. As such, social and 
political viability cannot be achieved without a fundamental resignification of the 
ideology that determines one’s status as “human.” This project aims to demonstrate how 
this reconceptualization can enable a broader understanding of gender and subjectivity 
that does not depend upon the creation, circumscription, and exclusion of the binarism 
that abjection makes possible. This objective necessarily involves an interrogation of “the
3
human” as it is presently constructed; yet, this analysis would not be complete without a 
consideration of the practical effects generated by the abjection of nonnormative gender 
and the attempt to overcome this expulsion. The goal is not only to examine the potential 
of redefining the terms of intelligibility, but also to consider how this process could 
plausibly be achieved, thus legitimating gender variance as a viable expression.
Given that “the human” is a legal category due to the legislation of human rights, 
the parameters of this concept are reified through the law, which allows the state to 
regulate its borders. This thesis will argue that legal definitions of humanity are based on 
cultural perceptions of subjectivity, and have consequently established ideology as law. 
As such, the sex/gender paradigm grounds both cultural and legislative understandings of 
“the human,” which consolidates the abjection of nonnormative gender and positions 
gender variant individuals outside state protection. To address this issue, Chapter Three 
examines how transgender rights activists are presently attempting to reconceptualize 
“the human” in legal terms through the acquisition of rights. By establishing gender 
variance as cognizable in the eyes of the state; this chapter aims to demonstrate that this 
recognition would not only resignify the legislated terms of humanity, it would facilitate 
the social and political viability of gender variant lives. Though this strategy is only one 
instance of reconceptualization, it illustrates the plausibility of this approach and its
r-
potential substantive effects. As such, the struggle to obtain rights offers an alternative to 
the terminological debate, while indicating that resignification is both politically feasible 
and activists are already working towards this goal. By examining the problems and 
proposed solutions regarding the restrictions of an ontological paradigm, this thesis
4
indicates that ideology has theoretical and practical implications, which are made clear by 
the endeavour to redefine the terms of intelligible personhood.
The objective to balance a theoretical analysis with the consideration of its 
substantive effects speaks to the body of criticism used throughout this thesis. The 
authors selected for this project were chosen both to situate and analyze the issue of 
ontology through the perspectives put forth by transgender scholarship, as opposed to 
appropriating the terms of this problem from a more conventional theoretical lens. 
Though non-trans authors are included in this work, particularly in Chapter Two, the 
overall focus of this thesis is grounded in the theoretical and political positions advanced 
by self-identified transgender and transsexual scholars. Though these authors greatly 
differ in some or all respects, the tensions and agreements between them signal a 
particular dialogue regarding the issue of viability, which this project attempts to bring to 
the fore. Though questions of terminology remain at the heart of this debate, these 
scholars indicate that matters of definition and redefinition necessarily generate
substantive effects that must be acknowledged in the contemplation of these broader
\
theoretical concerns. Without this context, gender variance easily becomes a trope of 
academic discourse, used to deconstruct gender norms without the consideration of how 
gender variant individuals are presently affected by this ideology (Ñamaste, Invisible 22 
-  23). This project endeavours to avoid this oversight by specifically examining the 
problem of social and political viability as established by transgender politics, and the 
potential solutions offered by transgender and transsexual activists and academics, while 
continuing to offer a theoretical analysis of why viability is an ontological concern. As
5
such, the object of inquiry is the ideological paradigm that prohibits this viability and 
subsequently renders gender variance abject.
In a similar vein, this project forgoes a discussion of “the inhuman” as a potential 
alternative to the binary model upon which “the human” is based. Though the concept of 
inhumanity will be addressed, this status will not be taken up as a solution to present 
conceptions of subjectivity, as the endeavour to replace binarism with hybridity merely 
inverts a binary relation and continues to generate ontological restrictions. Notions of 
“the inhuman” that retain their peripheral status in order to disrupt normative paradigms 
indicate that this concept maintains an oppositional stance, which requires the 
continuation of binarism and its subsequent exclusions. Though the terms of intelligibility 
would be overturned, substituting one prescriptive model of being with another is not 
conducive to the project of increasing the possibility of numerous different lives, i
Furthermore, designating gender variance as a distinctly “inhuman” or “post­
human” mode of being undermines the present attempt to establish nonnormative gender
as a viable expression of human subjectivity. The objective to reconceptualize the
\
parameters of “the human” is not to oppose or eliminate this ontological category, but to 
fundamentally alter the foundation though which individuals achieve access to this status. 
By instantiating gender variance as a prototype for “the inhuman,” this political aim is 
overshadowed by a concentration on creating, defining, and categorizing another “type” 
of being that risks establishing nonnormative gender as a theoretical trope. Thus, the goal 
of resignification is not to promote hybridity, but to advocate the possibility of various 
subjectivities as equally plausible manifestations of “the human.” However, the
6
ontological “flexibility” required to achieve this recognition does not extinguish the 
problem of categorization.
Though the examination of human subjectivity indicates that the problem of 
viability is an ontological concern, this critical refocusing does not negate the fact that 
“the human” is a category, bound by the limitation of definition. By reconceptualizing the 
foundation of being to make more lives “livable,” this resignification avoids prescribing a 
specific model of subjectivity, leaving “the human” open to various permutations. Yet, 
without a particular definition to establish the boundaries of this concept, does “the 
human” run the risk of losing its significance as a category? And how does this 
expansiveness differ from the current dilemma posed by the understanding of 
“transgender” as a capacious label? Though these questions illustrate the complexities 
engendered by issues of (re)definition, the elasticity of a political term and the flexibility 
of an ontological paradigm necessarily generate different effects, as the context of each 
greatly varies.
Because “transgender” is bound to the discourse of identity politics, this thesis
. . .  \
will argue that its plasticity is unable to transcend the limitations imposed by this 
framework; however, as this project will demonstrate, the process of abjection creates the 
possibility to reconceptualize notions of subjectivity that allow for the paradigm change 
required to establish a multiplicity of being. Nevertheless, these different outcomes do 
not resolve the problem of plurality in the endeavour to conceive of “the human” as a 
concept based on diversity, for what would this category represent? This conundrum is 
the inevitable risk of attempting to consider notions of subjectivity outside the limitations 
of binarism; yet, as Judith Butler notes, this definitional “openness” does not prohibit the
7
struggle to realize certain values in the effort to achieve a more just conception of 
ontology (Undoing 36). Rather, the objective is to maintain this flexibility while positing 
these ideas, recognizing that the process of creating “the human” is never complete and 
must continue to be renegotiated to increase the scope of livable lives. With this assertion 
in mind, this project will set aside this inherent contradiction to consider the possibilities 
enabled by this paradox.
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' ; Terminological Aporia: The Meaning of “Transgender” and its Dual Effect 
Though the term “transgender”1 has become relatively ubiquitous in the past 
decade, the cultural currency of this word is presently embroiled in a controversial debate 
regarding the meaning of this label and the politics it denotes. Despite its coinage in the 
late 20th century, “transgender” has a complex etymological history that points to this 
ongoing dispute. Presently, the term is understood as an “umbrella” label meant to 
instantiate numerous gender diverse identities, expressions, and persons. As this chapter 
will demonstrate, this perception of “transgender” is grounded in the rhetoric of anti- 
identity politics, and has been conceived as a distinctively queer term in addition to a
more generalized label for all forms of gender variance. Though these concurrent
1
understandings greatly differ in some respects, the expansiveness denoted by each term is 
meant to signify the term’s inclusivity, which has been positioned as a way to overcome 
the binarism imposed by the sex/gender paradigm, and more broadly, identity. This 
chapter will examine the tensions that have resulted from this capaciousness, as well as 
the differing perceptions of the term and its overall discursive function, arguing that this 
attempt to transcend the limitations of identity politics has inadvertently maintained these 
effects by upholding the binary relation it means to surpass. This contradiction has 
resulted in the dual effect of exclusion and erasure, indicating that “transgender” is 
unable to instantiate its various constituents as politically viable subjects. To address this 
dilemma, this chapter will posit the benefits of an ontological analysis that takes up the 
specificity of gendered subjectivity as a means of moving past the aporia of this 
terminological debate. 1
1 “Transgender” will be put in quotations marks throughout this chapter to indicate that the meaning o f  the 
term is still undecided, and thus it is uncertain what this label is meant to signify.
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1. Transgender
In contemporary North America, the term “transgender” has become synonymous 
with a definitional dispute that has taken precedence within transgender scholarship, 
politics, and activism. Western scholars, advocates, and allies have spent a significant 
amount of time belabouring the terminological parameters of this category, yet despite 
this effort, a consensus has not been met. Unsurprisingly, the various meanings attributed 
to this signifier are still being negotiated and re-transcribed. Julia Serano notes that a 
plethora of different categories classified as “transgender” have only emerged within the 
past decade,2 3and that previous terms used to describe gender nonconforming practices 
and identities are often viewed as outdated or offensive (23). Serano further notes that 
the terminology currently in use is frequently contested, as many individuals who take up 
and employ these labels ascribe different definitions to each term (23). These diverse 
invocations of “transgender” and its numerous subsets, alongside its ceaseless and 
contentious terminological evolution, indicate that the cultural currency of this term is not 
only precarious, but is also contingent upon the particular context in which it is used. 
Susan Stryker claims that this “definitional wrangling” and terminological instability will 
persist until a level of agreement is reached regarding “who deploys these terms, in which 
contexts, and with what intent” (“Introduction” 148).
Though “transgender” is a relatively new category, the meaning attributed to this 
signifier has perpetually changed since the term’s inception in the late 20th century.
2
E.g. FTM, MTF, boyz, grrls, genderqueer, transman, transwoman, cross-dresser etc. For a more extensive
list, see Namaste, Sex Change 18.
3 E.g. the terms transvestite and transsexual precede the use o f  transgender as a label for nonnormative 
gender expression and some members o f the “transgender community” view both as antiquated and/or _  
derogatory. This is largely due to the perception o f  these terms as diagnostic categories that were coined by 
the medical community, and subsequently pathologized (Currah 4; Valentine, Imagining 33; Stryker, , 
“Frankenstein” 251).
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Originally coined as a distinct subject position, “transgender” has the linguistic history of 
a noun, verb, and adjective. The term was initially introduced as an identity category 
during the 1970s (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 251); however, since this time, “transgender” 
has also come to signify the act of transgressing or “crossing” socially normative gender 
boundaries (Stryker, History 24), and has been used as a descriptive label for an array of 
gender variant persons, practices, and identities, many of which were previously / 
understood as distinct (Valentine, Imagining 4).
Presently, “transgender” is routinely constructed as “a catchall term for all 
nonnormative forms of gender expression and identity” (Stryker, History 123), yet David 
Valentine notes that this signifier continues to be taken up as both an identity category 
and a verb for gender transgression despite its ostensible consolidation as an adjective 
{Imagining 39). The term is often reduced to its prefix to denote its flexibility and 
inclusivity; however, many have maintained that “trans” refers to a specific type of 
person, generally “those who identify with a gender other than the one they were
assigned to at birth” (Stryker, History 19). Though this latter interpretation is relatively
\
transparent, the more capacious understanding of “trans” can be used to signify “various 
kinds of sex and gender crossings, and [the] various levels of permanence to these 
transitions...the medical technologies that transform sexed bodies, to cross-dressing, to 
passing,4 to a certain kind of ‘life plot,’ to being legible as one’s birth sex, but with a 
‘contradictory ’ gender inflection” (Noble 2), so that the term points to its own 
discursivity as much as it refers to any of these and/or other definitions.
4 “Passing” is generally understood as living in one’s gender o f  choice while being socially perceived as a 
“natural” or biological member o f  that gender according to the logic o f the sex/gender paradigm (Stone 
231).
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Numerous activists and scholars have positioned this contemporary expansion of 
“transgender” into a collective or umbrella term as a social and political strength due to 
its purported ability to represent a broad range of individuals, identities, and practices 
(Ñamaste, Invisible 60). These authors often describe the word as a convenient, 
generalized term through which to discuss diverse forms of gender variability without 
pointing to any one experience or manifestation (Stryker, History 24). However, the 
celebrated elasticity of the term has also been cited as a source of contention in spite of 
its alleged inclusivity. Valentine argues that regardless of the catchall definition, 
“transgender” continues to generate exclusions and erasures that inform and delineate the 
current understandings of this word (Imagining 33). Stryker similarly claims that the 
collectivity attributed to the term is unable to transcend the various inclusions and 
occlusions inherent to the process of categorization {History 24), which is further 
complicated by the numerous other interpretations that continue to be invoked alongside 
this flexible understanding.
Aware of these multiple complications, Serano suggests that “transgender” should 
be envisaged predominantly as a political term that unites its constituents based on shared 
objectives, as opposed to implying any commonality between those marked by this label 
(26). Nevertheless, the political goals and effects tied to this category vary according to 
the definition that is taken up (Valentine//magmmg 39), indicating that “transgender” 
politics cannot be severed from the divergent meanings this signifier is used to denote. 
The terminological aporia generated by this debate has consequently extended beyond the 
strictly discursive to effect various socio-political consequences for those who inhabit 
this signifer’s nebulous boundaries. Whether “transgender” is employed as a noun, verb,
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or adjective, the complexities produced by this definitional dispute have affected not only 
the cultural viability of this term, but also the viability of the various identities, practices, 
and persons encompassed by this label in some contexts and excluded in others. The 
political effects engendered by these uncertain definitional boundaries can accordingly be 
traced to the etymological development of this amorphous signifier.
2. Etymology
When the term was initially coined in the 1970s, “transgender” was used to 
designate a particular subject position for individuals who resisted classification as 
transvestites or transsexuals (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 251). Unlike the latter two 
categories, “transgender” was not constructed as a diagnostic label; rather, this signifier 
was conceived as a grassroots term meant to defy the pathologizing lexicon created by 
the psychiatric community to describe gender nonconforming behaviours and identities 
(Currah 4).5 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, sexologists had begun to 
identify gender variance as a mental health concern (Styker, History 37 -  38), and by 
1910, the term “transvestite” had come to represent a type of paraphilia (Stryker, History 
16).6 Forty years later, “transsexual” was established as another diagnostic category 
through which to classify certain gender variant persons (Stryker, History 18). Though 
each term signaled a transition across the socially normative boundaries of gender 
binarism, transsexual was coined to “distinguish people who sought surgical 
transformation from those who wanted to alter their gender presentation without medical 
intervention” (Stryker, History 49). This latter definition was used to classify
5 Accordingly, many activists have described “transgender” as a label o f empowerment and self-definition 
able to designate the specificity o f  gender variance as a valid mode o f  gendered being (Currah 4).
6 Paraphilia is a psychiatric term that denotes a mental disorder characterized by abnormal sexual desires.
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transvestites, and originally included a wide range of gender variant phenomena, yet 
came to denote the episodic practice of cross-dressing for erotic pleasure (Stryker, 
History 17).7
The deviancy and abnormality associated with transvestism and transsexuality 
greatly influenced the grassroots inauguration of “transgender” as an identity category 
(Valentine, Imagining 32). Transgender activist Virginia Prince, who is accredited with 
originating the term, sought to demarcate and normalize a particular form of gender 
variance by explicitly rejecting paraphilic transvestism (Valentine, Imagining 32) and 
transsexual surgeries (Stryker, History 46). She claimed that a specific term was required 
to represent individuals who had “permanently changed their social gender without 
permanently altering their genitals” (Stryker, History 123); unlike transvestites, these 
persons did not periodically alter their gender presentation, and unlike transsexuals, they 
did not seek to surgically modify their bodies. Though all three terms indicated a 
transition across the sex/gender paradigm, Prince dissociated her neologism from the
o
sexual deviancy linked to transvestism (Valentine, Imagining 32) and opposed 
transsexual body modification (Stryker, History 46). By establishing a distinct social 
category that repudiated these pathologized behaviours, Prince attempted to position 
“transgender” as a normative gender identity that maintained the standard conventions of
7
This behaviour was predominantly associated with men and continues to cany this connotation (Stryker, 
History 17). Presently, the term “transvestite” has been replaced with “cross-dresser,” which can refer to 
both men and women and does not depict cross-dressing as an erotic practice, though this activity is still 
regarded as a temporary expression (Stryker, History 17—18).g
Prince did not reject the practice o f  cross-dressing, but rather the participation in this behaviour for sexual 
gratification. For Prince, “appropriate” cross-dressing was a form o f gender expression, not a sexual 
activity (Califia 199 - 200).
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femininity and masculinity despite crossing between these poles.* 9 As such, “transgender”
was situated as an additional gender category meant to supplement and consolidate binary
. ' • )
gender.
Although Prince distinguished her terminology from transvestite and transsexual 
as an appeal to normativity, this understanding of “transgender” as a “third way” between 
these two renounced terms quickly became politicized as an alternative to binary gender 
(Valentine, Imagining 32). By the 1990s, a wave of activism emerged in the United 
States that utilized this category to challenge gender normativity and claim a designated 
space for cross-gender identification rather than adhering to a two-gender framework 
(Valentine, Imagining 32). Within the decade, this notion of “transgender” evolved into 
its present manifestation as a collective or catchall term that is frequently described as 
follows:
In contemporary usage, transgender has become an “umbrella” term that is used 
to describe a wide range of identities and experiences, including but not limited 
to: pre-operative, post-operative, and non-operative transsexual people; male and 
female cross-dressers...; intersexed individuals; and men and women.. ..whose 
appearance or characteristics are perceived to be gender atypical. In its broadest 
sense, transgender encompasses anyone whose identity or behavior falls outside 
stereotypical gender norms. That includes people who do not self-identify a s ; 
transgender, but who are perceived as such by others and thus are subject to the 
same social oppressions... as those who actually identify with any of these 
categories. (Green 3 - 4 )
This radical expansion of the term’s meaning signaled its move from an identity category 
to a descriptive term meant to encompass a seemingly endless variety of nonnormative 
gender expressions and identities. Though the previous definition rejected transvestite 
and transsexual as diagnostic categories, the contemporary construction of “transgender”
g
Prince endorsed conservative stereotypes regarding masculine and feminine behaviour, which bolstered 
her assertion that “transgender” is a normative gender category (Stryker, History 46).
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intentionally subsumed these labels alongside many others in order to “replace an 
assumption of individual pathology with a series of claims about citizenship, self- 
determination, and freedom from violence and discrimination” (Valentine, Imagining 33). 
Again, the term was pitted against the psychiatric community’s pathologizing lens; 
however, the objective of using this category was no longer to instantiate a particular 
form of gender variance, but to valorize all gender diverse identities and practices by 
incorporating them under a single sign.10 1
Though the collective understanding of “transgender” continued to resist the 
diagnostic imperative of mental health professionals, Serano notes that the expansion of 
this category was “designed to accommodate the many gender and sexual minorities who 
were excluded from the previous feminist and gay rights movements” (25 -  26). During 
the 1950s and 60s, it was not uncommon for gender variant and homosexual activism to 
intersect, as many gender nonconforming persons identified as gay (Valentine Imagining 
55); however, by the 1970s gender diverse communities had deliberately been excluded 
from both homosexual and feminist politics (Stryker, History 94). The rationale behind 
this political ostracism was twofold: mainstream gay and lesbian activism intentionally 
separated same-sex attraction from the stigma of gender variance in order to 
depathologize homosexuality (Valentine, Imagining 55),11 and lesbian feminism insisted 
gender-crossing individuals were “politically regressive dupes of the patriarchal gender
10 The capaciousness o f this term and its effects will be taken up in the third section o f  this chapter entitled 
“Discursive Function.”
11 Homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental 
Disorders (DSM) from its first edition, which was published in 1952 by the American Psychiatric 
Association. To disassociate homosexuality from pathology, the rejection o f  gender variance by gay 
activists equally applied to homosexual cross-dressers and transsexuals, effeminate gay men, butch 
lesbians, and any other individual whose gender expression was considered nonnormative (Valentine, 
Imagining 48 — 55).
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system” (Stryker, History 101). By 1973, homosexuality had been delisted as a mental 
disorder, yet this victory had been won at the expense of gender variant individuals, who 
were further disparaged by gay activists’ emphasis on gender normativity (Valentine, 
Imagining 55): This repudiation was consolidated by the gynocentric mandate put 
forward by lesbian feminism, which held that male-to-female individuals violated 
women’s spaces (Stryker, History 102), and that female-to-male individuals betrayed 
their sex by attempting to access male privilege (Feinberg, Warriors 83). Both forms of 
gender crossing were criticized by feminists as perpetuating the stereotypes of a gender
n
i  ^
system constructed by men to oppress “women-bom-women” (Stryker, History 100).
Despite the recent introduction of “transgender” as an identity category, thé 1970s 
signaled a growing hostility towards gender variant individuals, where “all across the 
political spectrum.. .the only options presented to them were to be considered bad, sick, 
or wrong” (Stryker History 113). Although gay liberation and feminism are generally 
regarded as politically progressive, these movements corroborated the perception of
gender variability as an aberration, which reinforced the extant agenda to classify
\ ■
nonnormative gender expression as a mental illness. The definition of “transgender” 
affirmed this impulse by rejecting the already pathologized labels of transvestism and 
transsexuality. By 1980, this multidirectional onslaught had culminated in the 
introduction of “gender identity disorder” to the fourth edition of the DSM, which was 
the first edition to be published after homosexuality was removed from its jurisdiction 
(Stryker, History 111). Though the pathologization of gender variance was already in 12
12
Lesbian feminism did not support gender normativity, but rather the notion o f  an essential female 
identity that had been obscured by patriarchal gender structures. For a more detailed history o f lesbian 
feminism and its rejection o f  gender crossing, see Califia 8 6 - 1 1 9 .
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effect; the psychiatric community now had an additional category through which to 
classify a multitude of gender variant individuals according to their level of “gender
1 idysphoria” (Valentine Imagining 55).
Unsurprisingly, the 1980s marked the further exclusion of gender diverse 
communities from broader social movements, which resulted in the increasingly inward 
focus of gender variant politics (Stryker, History 113); however, by the 1990s, the 
cumulative effects generated by this enmity had triggered an unprecedented response that 
manifested as the “new transgender activism” (Stryker,1 History 121). This insurgent 
movement resisted the pathologization and political ostracism of myriad gender variant 
individuals by intentionally resignifying “transgender” as a collective and politically 
charged term (Serano 351). By expanding the definition of this label, “transgender” 
activists offered political inclusion and mobilization to all those who were explicitly 
barred from gay and feminist activism to substantiate the identity-based politics of these 
movements. Serano claims that the development of “transgender” as a “borderless”
signifier directly resulted from the polemical disputes regarding “who counts as a
\
‘woman’ or who is legitimately ‘gay’” (353). In rejecting the essentialist and 
assimilationist politics inherent to these arguments, “transgender” activism effectively
Gender identity disorder (GID) or “gender dysphoria” is understood as “[f]eelings o f unhappiness or 
distress about the incongruence between the gender-signifying parts o f  one’s body, one’s gender identity, 
and one’s social gender” (Stryker, History 13). GID remains the formal diagnosis for gender variant 
behaviours, practices, and identifications (excluding transvestic fetishism, which is considered a paraphilia) 
(Valentine, Imagining 55). Because “transgender” is not a psychiatric term, it is not listed as a diagnostic 
category in the DSM; however, transgender identification would fall under GID. Many “transgender” 
activists are presently fighting to have GID removed from the DSM, much like the. gay activists that 
demanded the depathologization o f  homosexuality; yet, as Vivian Nàmaste notes, delisting GID would pose 
significant complications for those who have access to health care insurance, making sex reassignment 
surgery and hormone therapy more difficult to obtain (Sex Change 8). Consequently, this issue has yet to be 
resolved, and has caused significant tension within “transgender” activism. For further information on this 
conflict, particularly with respect to health care access, see Namaste, Sex Change 8 - 3 1 .
18
established itself as an anti-identity collective that flaunted the diversity of its members 
as a solution to the uniformity mandated by previous movements (Serano 353).
The politicization of “transgender” as an umbrella term occurred in tandem with 
the emergence of queer theory and activism, which reinforced the conception of this 
signifier as a label of resistance (Serano 351). Both movements arose during the early 
1990s (Valentine, Imagining 24) and established their politics through the 
reconceptualization of existing terminology. The term queer was previously considered a 
derogatory word for homosexuality (Stryker, History 20); however, activists and 
academics reclaimed this category to establish “a ‘posthomosexuaT refiguration...of
people marginalized by sexuality, embodiment, and gender” (Stryker, “Introduction”
(
151). Like “transgender,” queer was resignified to denote an expansive terrain of 
nonnormative expression, though this movement pertained more specifically to non­
heterosexual manifestations of sexuality as opposed to gender variance (Serano 351). 
Nevertheless, the overall meaning attributed to this term situated queer as “a category 
without a stable referent that acquires its specific meaning from the logic of its 
oppositions to a norm” (Stryker, “Introduction” 151). As such, queer became a general 
signifier for “anti-normative rearticulations” of existing cultural paradigms (Noble 13), 
and could subsequently function as an adjective or verb (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 251). 
This flexibility allowed queer to signal a range of different meanings; however, the 
term’s cultural currency was rooted in an anti-heteronormative discourse that 
distinguished queer activism from the exclusive and integrationist politics of its 
mainstream gay and lesbian predecessors (Stryker, History 134 -  136).
Although queer was predominantly understood as an “all-encompassing point of
resistance to heteronormativity” (Stryker, “Introduction” 151), many interpreted this 
meaning to include the explicit contestation of gender binarism due to the naturalization 
of heterosexual desire via the sex/gender paradigm (Stryker, History 20). This dual 
perception of queer as both a sexual and gender “dis-orientation” established this signifier 
as a discursive tool through which to destabilize fixed notions of subjectivity based on 
normative perceptions of sexual orientation, gender, and sex (Valentine, Imagining 260). 
As a result, queer was often conflated with various other signifiers that were considered 
disruptive to conventional expressions of sexuality and gender (Stryker, “Introduction” 
148). Not surprisingly, “transgender” was included in this nonnormative repertoire as a 
particular interpretation of queer (Stryker, “Introduction” 149).14 This terminological 
overlap subsequently generated a political alliance between queer and “transgender” 
activists that was grounded in an opposition to heterosexist norms (Stryker, History 136). 
Both terms were regarded as inclusive, anti-normative labels that intentionally 
confounded stabilized spaces of meaning based on predetermined understandings of the 
sex/gender paradigm (Serano 351). Like queer, “transgender” was positioned as an 
adjective and verb, as both words were used to indicate and describe various sexual and 
gender disruptions (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 251). Though many continued to make a 
distinction between these two terms, the contemporary understanding of “transgender” 
effectively manifested as a queer social location resulting in the frequent perception of 
these labels as synonymous (Halberstam 291). :
This understanding of “transgender” as “an inflection of queer” (Stryker, 
“Introduction” 152; emphasis in original) is often attributed to Leslie Feinberg
14
The queer understanding o f “transgender” and its effects will also be revisited in the third section o f  this 
chapter.
20
(Valentine, Imagining 33), whose 1992 publication “Transgender Liberation: A 
Movement Whose Time Has Come” instituted this signifier as an umbrella term meant to 
incite political action and solidarity (Feinberg, “Liberation” 206). Feinberg’s critical tract 
asserted that “transgender” individuals were members of a persecuted class based on a 
shared oppression that originated from the historical indoctrination of gender binarism 
(“Liberation” 207). Accordingly, Feinberg called for a “transgender” revolution that 
celebrated gender variance as a resistance to the sex/gender paradigm and mandated the 
collapse of this system (“Liberation” 220). By organizing this movement around the
collective understanding of “transgender,” Feinberg consolidated the meaning of this
/
term as both a “utopian point of inclusive diversity” (Stryker, “Introduction” 152), and a 
contestation of gender normativity. However, in using this label, s/he also constructed a 
common history that united cross-cultural and historically specific forms of gender 
variance, thus establishing a universal foundation through which to organize diverse 
groups of people (Feinberg, “Liberation” 207).15 This ahistorical perception of
“transgender” was later criticized as a homogenization of gender diverse identities and
\
practices, and was consequently rejected by many as a cultural-historical 
misappropriation, which resulted in the present understanding of this term as a 
contemporary Western construct (Towle and Morgan 671; Valentine, Imagining 17).
Though the political effects of “transgender” were apparent from its original 
coinage, the collective understanding of this term was imperative to its widespread 
perception as an oppositional label rooted in grassroots political organizing. The
15 Feinberg popularized the use o f gender non-specific pronouns like “s/he” and “hir” to contest the 
restrictions o f gender binarism and point to the specificity o f gender variant expression and identity 
(Stryker & Whittle 205).
21
introduction of “transgender” as an identity category initialized a politics of gender 
variance based on the repudiation of certain behaviours, a resistance to pathologization, 
and an appeal to normativity through the consolidation of binary gender;16 however, by 
the 1990s, the evolution of the term’s meaning signaled a drastic change in politics that 
culminated in the . collective defiance of a system it once supported. The rejection of the 
sex/gender paradigm epitomized the transformation of “transgender” from an exclusive, 
gender normative subject position to an inclusive, anti-identity collective that asserted the 
validity of gender variance as a subversive political tactic. As such, the conception of 
“transgender” as an umbrella term materialized through the resistance to binary gender; 
yet, this expansive signifier continued to resonate as ah identity category despite the 
collectivity it was used to denote. Due to the previous connotations of this term as a 
specific subject position, “transgender” was often taken up as both an adjective and 
noun,17 marking stabilized spaces of meaning while simultaneously deconstructing these 
spaces in other contexts (Stryker, History 19). Valentine claims that this usage of
“transgender” has led to its development as a “collective category of identity” {Imagining
\
4), though Stryker argues that this perception is a misconstruction and maintains that 
“transgender” is an adjective (History 138). As a result, this label can ultimately “stand
16 This is not to say that prior to the introduction o f  “transgender,” gender variant politics were nonexistent. 
Rather, this term marks the beginning o f a particular branch o f  gender diverse politics that was popularized 
during the latter part o f  the 20th century.
17 Though the contemporary understanding o f “transgender” as a catchall term has permitted the continued 
use o f this word as both an adjective and a verb, it is more frequently cited as the former. In essence, the 
ubiquitous use o f  “transgender” as an adjective has overshadowed its understanding as a verb, yet the 
potential to take up this term as a verb remains. For the sake o f  consistency and relevance, this chapter will 
refer to the collective perception o f  “transgender” as an adjective going forward. Nevertheless, 
“transgender” as an adjective should also be understood as “transgender” as a verb because the discursive 
flexibility o f  the term continues to allow this interchangeability.
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both as a description of individual identity and simultaneously as a general term for 
gendered transgressions of many kinds[,] mak[ing] it almost infinitely elastic” (Valentine, 
Imagining 39). This variability has remained the common thread among the different 
interpretations of the word, bringing “transgender” to the present moment where the 
meaning of this term is still undecided.
The political ramifications generated by these disparate understandings become 
apparent when considering the anti-transsexual roots embedded in the term’s various 
meanings. From its inception as a category, “transgender” has been associated with the 
repudiation of transsexuality, which has resulted in a political rift over the current 
understanding of the term and the various practices and identities denoted by this label. 
The explicit rejection of genital surgeiy as a pathological desire affirmed the 
“antitranssexualism” of the original definition (Stryker, “Introduction” 153); however, 
many have argued that the contemporary understanding of “transgender” as an umbrella 
term has perpetuated this discrimination despite its ostensible inclusivity (Namaste, Sex 
Change 4). Though transsexual persons were intentionally barred from “transgender” 
identity politics as an appeal to normativity, the transformation of this movement into an 
anti-identity collective has inversely been accused of “privileg[ing] those identities, 
actions, and appearances that most visibly ‘transgress’ gender norms” (Serano 26); with 
the interpretation of “transgender” as queer, many “transgender” activists came to regard 
transsexuality not as a mental illness, but as a reification of gender binarism, which this 
politics set out to deconstruct (Rubin 276). This perception of transsexuality as 
antithetical to queer was rooted in the understanding of this term as “maintaining the 
same relationship between gender identity and body morphology as is enforced within
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lieteronormative culture” (Halberstam 291). By aligning the body with one’s chosen 
gender through surgical intervention, transsexuals were seen as preserving binary gender 
rather than disrupting this paradigm, which warranted their exclusion from “transgender” 
politics according to numerous activists (Serano 347 -  348).
Though others continued to perceive transsexuality as a particular manifestation 
of “transgender” (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 251), the concurrent invalidation of the former 
via the politics of the latter restored the converse understanding of transsexual and 
“transgender” as two discrete categories tied to conflicting political motivations (Califia 
275). This segregation of terms has produced a significant rupture in contemporary 
“transgender” activism that has yet to be resolved (Namaste, Sex Change 20). Although 
the distinction between these labels originally pertained to the desire for genital surgery, 
the definitive factor in dividing these terms is now dependent upon one’s relation to 
gender.18 Despite the apparent condemnation of sex reassignment surgery by 
queer/“transgender” activists, this disapproval only occurred if one’s body modification 
was perceived as an attempt to assimilate according to conventional gender norms 
(Serano 348). This political stance subsequently generated two different camps within the 
“transgender” movement regarding the contestation of gender normativity. The queer 
understanding of “transgender” has been maintained; however, the repudiation of : ; 
transsexuals as “gender normative” has generated a backlash that has come to criticize 
the deconstruction of binary gender as politically regressive (Serano 349). As a result of
Although transsexuality is still predominantly linked to sex reassignment surgery, it is the gendered 
transition from male to female or vice versa that is imperative to transsexual identity rather than the surgery 
itself. Many transsexuals do not have surgery, as they often do not have access to health care and/or the 
economic means required for these procedures, and others do not wish to surgically modify their body 
(Shelley 69 -7 0 ) .
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this conflict, those who identify as “transgender” are often perceived as queer, whereas 
transsexuals have retained their association with gender binarism (Shelley 8); yet, this 
distinction is not without complications given that these terms continue to be associated 
with the same political movement despite the tensions that exist between them. Due to 
the expansive and varied understanding of “transgender,” this signifler is also used 
interchangeably with both transsexual and queer, confounding the notion that these labels 
denote significantly different meanings (Stryker, “Introduction” 149). As such, 
“transgender” has come to represent a set of contradictory politics that can unify or 
segregate the various constituents of this movement according to the definition that is 
invoked, which has further convoluted the present understanding of this term and the 
objectives of its accompanying activism.
3. Discursive Function <
The terminological instability that has resulted from these competing 
interpretations has come not only to define the “transgender” movement, but also to bind
the cultural and political viability of this signifier, the individuals it marks, and the
\
politics it denotes to the particular context in which this term is used. The conflict
generated by these concurrent understandings has restricted the cultural resonance of the
i
term so that the meaning of this signifier is contingent upon the individual instances in 
which it is invoked, and the subsequent specifications required to indicate the particular 
definition being cited. This contextual dependence has subsequently affected the cultural 
currency of the various politics, identities, and practices associated with this term, as their 
meanings have been destabilized by the disparate and conflicting interpretations of the 
label that ostensibly unifies them. This debate, and the continual need to define one’s use
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of the word, has consequently undermined the perception of “transgender” as a 
generalized term for all forms of gender variance. As a result, “transgender” has 
developed as a fluid and esoteric label, the meaning of which can change throughout a 
single text (Valentine, Imagining 39).19
In summary, the aporia engendered by this definitional dispute has coalesced 
around the understanding of “transgender” as either inclusive or exclusive, an identity or 
an adjective, and whether these interpretations contest or consolidate binary gender. The 
rift in contemporary “transgender” activism has elucidated the complexities surrounding 
these various perceptions, signaling a larger dynamic that has hindered these politics. 
Though classified by the same social movement, these two political factions mark a 
polarity that is reflective of the present dilemma embedded in “transgender’s” discursive 
function. In the endeavour to represent a myriad of gender variant identities and 
practices, this signifier has produced two concomitant effects that have compromised 
both the meaning of this label and its corresponding politics. Despite the etymological
development of “transgender” as a catchall term, its instantiation as queer has perpetuated
\
the original exclusivity of the word; however, the understanding of this category as a 
capacious label for all gender variance (regardless of one’s political affiliation) has 
inversely “erase[d] the distinctiveness of its constituents” (Serano 26). Serano notes that . 
the struggle to define who qualifies as “transgender” according to which criteria and set 
of politics has ironically reproduced the occlusiveness of the previous identity-based 
movements this collectivity set out to oppose (352 -  353); yet, for those who do not make
19 “Text” should be understood as denoting an individual written work. Valentine notes that due to the 
elasticity o f  the term, an author’s use o f  “transgender” can convey one meaning in a certain context, and a 
different meaning in another context, often unintentionally.
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this distinction, the various practices and identities subsumed by this term lose the very 
specificity “transgender” is meant to denote (Namaste, Invisible 60). Many have argued 
that the attempt to signify every manifestation of gender variance has obscured the 
disparities that exist between and among the numerous expressions and identities
I
classified by this label, thus undermining the diversity this term allegedly conveys.
This dual effect generated by the collective understanding of “transgender” 
signals the underlying binarism that informs the contemporary perception of this label.
By employing an all-encompassing signifier to transcend the limitations of identity 
politics, “transgender” activists have maintained a binary framework wherein the 
collectivity of this term is made possible through its direct opposition to the notion of a 
shared identity. Accordingly, this opposition has established the “transgender” movement 
as an inverse manifestation of the politics it claims to surpass. By constructing itself as an 
anti-identity collective, “transgender” activism has invariably confirmed the continued 
importance of identity to the political resistance of this movement and its criteria of
i
belonging. This opposition has thus served as a foundation through which to unite the 
constituents of the “transgender” movement, resulting in a discourse of exclusivity 
regarding conceptions of identity as the basis of politics. Serano asserts, “by promoting 
the idea that we must move beyond the outdated concept of ‘identity,’ the transgender 
movement has created its own sense o f ‘oneness’” (354).
This “oneness” has established the parameters of contemporary “transgender” 
politics, indicating that this movement has been constituted by its anti-identity agenda 
rather than the inclusivity it propounds. As a result, both the queer and expansive
See Currah 5; Namaste, Invisible 60; Serano 26; Valentine, “Calculus” 45; Towle & Morgan 672.20
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interpretations of this signifier produce the same outcome: the exclusivity of the former 
erases the specificity of its queer constituents through political homogenization, while the 
inclusivity of the latter is contingent upon the explicit rejection of identity, a distinction 
that ultimately nullifies the diversity of gender variance. As such, “transgender’s” dual 
effect is a result of the anti-identity politics that make the collectivity of this term 
possible, and subsequently inform the terminological debates that surround the 
contemporary definition of the word. Regardless of the interpretation, the binarism that 
grounds this expansive signifier will continue to frame these disputes around the notion 
of identity, generating an exclusion/erasure dynamic that indicates “transgender” politics 
has not transcended the dilemma posed by previous identity-based movements. 
Consequently, this label is unable to represent the manifold practices and identities it 
endeavours to signify, which compromises both the political viability of this term and 
those subsumed under its extensive reach. The following examination of “transgender” as 
both the queer and capacious will further demonstrate the function of this dual effect.
Though the politicization of “transgender” as queer consolidated the 
understanding of this signifier as a catchall term, Serano claims that this collective 
resistance to binary gender has materialized as “one big homogeneous group of 
individuals who blur gender boundaries” (354). Despite the inclusive, anti-identity 
politics of this movement, several scholars have claimed that the queer interpretation of 
“transgender” has established this category as a shared subject position that has merely 
coalesced around an opposition rather than a norm. Serano describes this process as 
“subversivism” (347), and claims that this contestation has reinforced the divide between
See Namaste,Sex Change 6 - 7 ;  Serano 349; Valentine, Imagining 32 -  33.21
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gender non-conforming and gender normative individuals by inverting the binarism that 
privileges conventional gender, as opposed to deconstructing the polarity that informs 
this privilege (349). Because the queer/“transgender” movement has been established 
through an opposition to binary gender, this paradigm must remain intact for its politics 
of resistance to persist, which as Serano and others have argued, has reversed rather 
than destabilized the sex/gender system so that queer expressions and identities are 
subsequently valorized. The rejection of gender normativity has thus become the norm 
through which one is established as “transgender,” which has restricted the radical 
inclusivity of this term by generating a prescribed subject position, as well as an “other,” 
to accompany queer/“transgender” politics.
This “queer identity” emerged with the activism of the 1990s, and was 
consolidated by such authors as Feinberg, Sandy Stone, and Kate Bomstein who called 
upon different “transgender” individuals to contest the sex/gender paradigm as a function 
of their gender expression and/or identity.2 3 By asserting that gender variant persons
share the same social oppression due to binary gender, Feinberg established a common
\
“transgender” experience rooted in the struggle to abolish this polarity. Though Stone 
specifically addressed transsexuals, her denunciation of “passing” similarly renounced 
conventional gender, claiming that gender normative identities are monolithic, 
phallocentric constructs that must be destabilized to allow for “the complexities and 
ambiguities of lived experience” (Stone 230). Finally, Bomstein explicitly rejected
22 See Elliot & Roen 239; Namaste, Sex Change 20; Prosser 32; Rubin 267.
23 See Bomstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women, and the Rest o f Us, 1994; Feinberg “Transgender 
Liberation: A Movement Whose Time Has Come,” 1994; Stone “The Empire Strikes Back: A 
Posttranssexual Manifesto,” 1991. Numerous other authors have contributed to this understanding o f  
“transgender” as queer; however, the above individuals have notably contributed to the construction and 
circulation o f  this meaning. , '
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gender variant individuals from the queer/“transgender” movement if they identified with 
binary gender, claiming that these persons endorsed a “bi-polar gender system” 
(Bomstein 132), which implicitly re-pathologized these individuals though a queer lens. 
Read together, these arguments combined to create a notion of “transgender” identity that 
is “properly queer” so that this term has evolved as a subject position that necessarily 
challenges existing gender hierarchies from a variety of political perspectives, such as 
feminist, anti-racist, anti-heteronormative, and anti-gender normative (Halberstam 307).
Namaste claims that this contemporary perception of “transgender” is often used 
to situate its constituents at the forefront of social change (Sex Change 7); however, she 
states that this understanding has invalidated transsexuality, as “many transsexuals do not 
see themselves in these terms” (Sex Change 6). By constructing a subject position that is 
explicitly political, the queer/“transgender” movement has set a precedent wherein the 
various practices and identities absorbed by this term are validated through their 
politicization, and as such, are devalued if they are not articulated according to these 
politics. Namaste argues that the majority of transsexuals, those who “situate themselves 
as ‘men’ and as ‘women,’ not as ‘gender radicals’ or ‘gender revolutionaries’” (Sex 
Change 6),24 have been excluded from this movement due to its political appropriation of 
identity (Sex Change 21) and/or erased by the queer homogenization of its members 
(Invisible 61). As Jay Prosser states, “not all gender crossing is queerly subversive” (32), 
nor is it subject to the same social oppression, as numerous gender variant individuals 
have been repudiated by the activists that claim to represent their interests (Namaste, Sex
24 Although many transsexuals describe themselves according to Namaste’s definition, others embrace the 
queer definition o f “transgender” and identify with these politics (Stryker “Introduction” 149).
Change 4).25 26As a result, Namaste explicitly depoliticizes transsexuality, claiming that
the acceptance of one’s identity ought not to be “conditional on a particular political
/
agenda” (Sex Change 9). She further argues that this continued concentration on identity 
has foreclosed a broader analysis of the institutional oppressions that are presently 
obstructing the lives of gender variant individuals (Sex Change 31). Serano claims that 
this political divisiveness has established queer/“transgender” politics as an insular 
movement rather than an outward-focused collective that has sacrificed not only the 
diversity of this activism, but also potential allies by re-privileging a binary construct 
(352-358).
Although the understanding of “transgender” as an expansive label for all gender 
variance seemingly neutralizes the debate regarding binary gender, this all-encompassing 
signifier continues to produce the dual effect generated by its queer counterpart. Stryker 
claims that this term’s elasticity prevents it from referring to a particular subject or 
expression, thus allowing “transgender” to depict a multitude of phenomena (History 
24); nevertheless, the anti-identity politics bound to this label implies a discursive 
“oneness” that is marked by the attempt to incorporate an endless proliferation of 
nonnormative gender expressions and identities under a single sign. Paisley Currah 
questions whether this endeavour undoes the multiplicity of the word, as it suggests that 
this plurality can be encapsulated and represented by one term (5). Namaste furthers 
claims that “transgender” has been “evacuated of meaning” due to this capaciousness and
25 . . . . . . .
Christopher Shelley has also noted that depending on one’s identity, gender expression, embodiment, 
and stage o f  transition, gender variant individuals can experience a wide range o f discrimination that
undermines the notion o f a universal experience o f oppression (53).
26 Namaste claims that by focusing on issues o f  identity, the transgender movement has prevented a larger 
analysis o f  the institutional forms o f  discrimination that are particular to gender variant individuals, such as 





is subsequently incapable of functioning as an adjective or identity (Sex Change 21).
Each author demonstrates that the inclusivity of this term has resulted in the erasure of 
specificity, indicating that the extensive understanding of this category has established 
“transgender” as “a term that marks everything and, by implication, absolutely nothing at 
all” (Noble 14 -  15). Accordingly, this catchall quality cannot signify anything beyond its 
own discursive fluidity. As Teresa de Lauretis argues, the plurality of “transgender” has 
restricted this term to a trope of language that bears no reference “to a gender, a sex, a 
sexuality, or a body” (261), indicating that it is “meaningful only as a sign” (261).
Serano claims that this discursive erasure, and thus the understanding of 
“transgender” as a borderless signifier, resulted from a conscious effort to prevent a 
hierarchy from forming within the “transgender” movement (353). She states that many 
activists intentionally blurred the differences between the various subgroups classified by 
this label to deter any one perspective from dominating the collective (353). As such, the 
endeavour to retain the plurality of “transgender” politics has inadvertently homogenized
its constituents by erasing the distinctiveness between them, resulting in a label that
\
marks a certain discursive plasticity rather than the diversity this movement continues to 
advocate. Consequently, this expansive definition has obscured the various perspectives 
and experiences of gender variant persons, in addition to the different obstacles they face. 
Both Serano (26) and Namaste (Sex Change 2) claim that many individuals categorized 
by this catchall term do not identify as “transgender” specifically because they believe 
this term obfuscates the specificity of their lived experience and the distinct issues they 
encounter as a result of their particular gender expression and identity. Valentine argues 27
27 ' 1 '■ '
Both Currah (5) and Namaste (.Invisible 61) reference de Lauretis to support their arguments regarding
“transgender’s” discursive elasticity.
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that this “unquestioned inclusion of people into the encompassing category of 
‘transgender’ produces a representational colonization of those lives” (“Calculus” 45), 
wherein the most marginalized gender variant individuals are co-opted by the broader 
agenda of the movement (Valentine, Imagining 14). He states that the use of this 
extensive definition has reproduced racial and class hierarchies, claiming that the most 
socially vulnerable gender variant persons cannot be accounted for by this discourse 
because they do not articulate themselves along these lines (Imagining 17).
As a result, this capaciousness has discursively appropriated the lives of dissenting 
individuals and erased the distinctiveness of their identities to serve the anti-identity 
politics of the “transgender” movement.
In the attempt to resist exclusivity and assimilation, the expansive interpretation
6 .
of “transgender” has bound the political value of this term to its discursive fluidity; 
however, as Currah questions, what are the consequences of forgoing identity to advocate 
on behalf of those “who trouble gender norms?” (5 -  6). That is, how does a movement
attain political viability for its constituents when the label that organizes this politics has
■ \
no stable referent, and the individuals marked by this term have vastly different 
experiences of gender and subjugation, in addition to conflicting perspectives regarding 
these experiences?28 9 Feinberg notes, “[i]t’s hard to fight an oppression without a name”
28 It should be noted that although “transgender” is an all-encompassing signifier, its recognition as a 
Western construct indicates that it cannot account for non-Westem experiences o f gender variance. As 
such, these individuals are excluded from the category in an attempt to avoid appropriating their lives, yet 
the appropriation o f Western gender variant individuals is considered unproblematic. .
Butler makes a similar observation in Gender Trouble with respect to the category “woman” as a shared 
political identity and subject position. Although her critique pertains to the exclusivity o f a defined identity 
category rather than an umbrella term, her argument notes the inability o f “woman” to represent the 
multiplicity o f  women, particularly with respect to racial and class differences (18 -  22). Though “woman” 
suggests a stable referent given its use as a universal category o f identity, the cultural, social, political, and 
experiential distinctions between women both globally and locally undermine this notion o f  a shared
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(“Liberation” 206), and though “transgender” offers a category through which to 
assemble a political mandate, it does not provide a corresponding subject position to 
ground the objectives of this movement, and as such, does not identify to whom these 
goals pertain and why. This ambiguity is politically problematic due to the historical
-3 A
legacy of identity-based activism in North America (Valentine, Imagining 37), which 
Currah claims has come to dominate public opinion on equality so that it is “almost 
unimaginable to base [rights] claims on anything other than ‘who one is’” (14). Valentine 
notes that this perception of identity has pervaded the entire spectrum of contemporary 
politics as the primary foundation through which to achieve rights, and thus, political 
recognition as a subject (Imagining 37). Consequently, activists have deployed 
“transgender” as a particular identity despite the catchall understanding of this term to 
establish the political viability of gender variant individuals (Currah 18); however, in so 
doing, they have undermined the anti-identity politics that inform the collectivity of this 
movement. Though Currah argues that this appeal to subjectivity is strategic and 
provisional (24), these activists have retained an identity-based framework to achieve 
their goals, indicating that the objectives and the politics of this movement are at odds. 
Accordingly, “transgender’s” discursive elasticity is returned to a binary distinction in 
praxis that reaffirms the importance of identity to the contradictory politics this category 
represents. 30
subject position. Consequently, “woman” does not have a stable referent and cannot politically instantiate 
many o f those it ostensibly names. Though Butler posits a certain “definitional incompleteness” or 
terminological flexibility as a way to resolve this issue, the capacious understanding o f  “transgender” 
demonstrates that the resignification o f  an identity category into a “permanently available site o f contested 
meanings” (21), does not eliminate the effects o f  exclusion and erasure, and the problem o f political 
representation. As such, the issue o f  identity and its present political necessity is not ameliorated by this
tactic." '■ : ! '■ ; ‘ '■
30 This legacy emerged out o f the civil rights movement in the United States, and was further consolidated 
by the women’s movement and the gay and lesbian rights movement (Valentine, Imagining 37).
f'
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4. From Terminology to Ontology
Regardless of the interpretation, the contemporary definition of “transgender” as 
an umbrella term has generated a dual effect, indicating the binarism that continues to 
inform the collective understanding of this label and the terminological debate that has 
resulted from this perception. The queer conception of this signifier excludes those who 
fail to contest binary gender and subsequently homogenizes those who reject gender 
norms by establishing an oppositional subjectivity; however, the capacious understanding 
of this category erases the specificity of its constituents through an anti-identity 
framework, only to return to an identity-based politics that necessarily reproduces the 
exclusivity of an established subject position. Furthermore, the collectivity of this term is 
made possible by the rejection of identity, which indicates that this inclusivity has been 
founded on a binary distinction that it attempts to overcome via the very expansiveness 
this distinction permits. As such, “transgender’s” catchall quality is contingent upon 
exclusion, which demonstrates that this umbrella term has not transcended the binarism
of identity politics, but rather has inverted this dualism. The paradox inherent to this
\
collective understanding has thus maintained the significance of identity within the 
“transgender” movement, which undermines the politics bound to this label. Both the 
queer and capacious interpretations of this category demonstrate this contradiction, as 
each continues to function inside an identity politics framework; while the former 
establishes a nonnormative subject position, the latter is invoked as an identity since the 
discursive fluidity of this term cannot instantiate a politically recognizable subject. As a 
result, this movement is unable to achieve the desired goal of an inclusive collective that 
exceeds the limitations of identity-based activism, yet is still politically viable. Every
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citation of “transgender” subsequently reinforces the instability generated by the 
underlying polarity that informs the collective understanding of this term.
The dual effect created by the continued relevance of identity to “transgender” 
politics indicates that the various interpretations of this term are unable to represent the 
entirety of this movement’s constituents. As each definition excludes and erases certain 
persons and practices, it is ultimately impossible to achieve the political inclusion, 
mobilization, and recognition these activists strive for while organizing their politics 
around this term and the debates that have taken place as a result of its collective 
definition. Yet, how does one escape the political dilemma posed by the concept of 
identity? Pat Califia claims that in “a gender-sane society.. .it must be possible for some 
of us to cling to our biological sex and the gender we were assigned at birth, while others 
wish to adapt the body to their gender of preference, and still others choose to question 
the very concept of polarized sexes” (275); however, the binarism that informs 
“transgender” either prohibits or nullifies these gender complexities, so how is this 
diversification of gender to be achieved? Though all of these gender expressions can be 
found under the “transgender” umbrella, their coexistence is rendered impossible by the 
present use of this term, which continues to rely on an identity politics framework. In 
addition, the various interpretations of this category have demonstrated that the perpetual 
resignification of “transgender” has only contributed to the terminological debate 
surrounding its definition, as opposed to releasing this term from the limitations of 
identity. Consequently, this label cannot offer political viability to many of those it 31
31 Although Califia’s description o f individuals who identify with the sex and gender they were assigned at 
birth may imply a non-trans, gender normative identity, it also refers to effeminate gay men, butch lesbians, 
and female and male cross-dressers, who are regularly included in the “transgender” collective.
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ostensibly names.
Although this issue has yet to be resolved, certain activists and authors have 
endeavoured to move beyond the concept of identity by refraining this dilemma from an 
ontological rather than an etymological perspective. Serano states, “[tjhere is no one right 
way to be trans” (29), and claims that it is equally valid for a “person to decide to 
transition and live as the other sex as it is for them to choose to blur gender boundaries” 
(28 - 29). Instead of concentrating on what “transgender” means or who it represents, 
Serano advocates a complex approach to gendered subjectivity that validates individual 
expression without attempting to prescribe or erase the specificity of this experience. 
Though she continues to employ “transgender” as an umbrella term, this assertion of 
difference and respect for various identities signals a movement away from the anti­
identity politics that informs this collective towards an alliance-based activism that 
maintains the distinctiveness and specific concerns of its various constituents (Serano 352 
-  354). According to Serano, the objective of this politics would no longer be to 
instantiate or oppose identity, but to accomplish a shared goal that is not contingent upon 
this binary framework (354). Although her use of “transgender” ultimately maintains the 
complications posed by this catchall term, she does not sacrifice ontology to discursivity, 
nor does she propose a shared subject position that homogenizes all gender variant 
individuals. Her refusal to relinquish the particularity of subjectivity to the demands of 
this definitional dispute allows Serano to suggest a coalition as an alternative to the 
present identity debates. • ’
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This insistence on the specificity of gendered being is consolidated by the
interrogation of the “prescribed relationship between biological sex, gender identity, and
gender expression” (Currah 23). Valentine and Riki Wilchins write, '
[b]odies which are suspect, whether because they are wearing T-shirts that 
proclaim “Transexual,”32 or because they have big Adam’s apples, or because 
they are bom with genitalia that cannot be classified as either male or female, are 
not what have to be explained. Rather, the requirement that they explain 
themselves should itself be investigated. (221)
Although this lens seems to oppose gender normativity, it is not masculinity and
femininity that are being contested, but rather the requirement that all identities reflect the
“forced unity of sex and gender” (Stryker, History 12). By focusing on the limitations of
this paradigm, activists transfer their attention to the various ontological experiences of
gender presently denied by this system, rather than reiterating the terminological disputes
that endeavour to “place” these manifestations according to a particular political agenda.
Currah notes that many advocates have suggested the notion of a gender continuum that
expands rather than eradicates binary gender, allowing for a more comprehensive
understanding of the different modes of gendered being without the need to classify
gender diversity under a single term (6). Accordingly, this analysis does not require
gender variant individuals to oppose gender normativity as an integral part of their
identity or political belonging, but rather suggests the potential coexistence of the various
expressions and identities both Califia and Serano suggest. As such, the concept of a
gender continuum supports the formation of a coalitional movement because it maintains
the specificity of subjectivity without privileging or homogenizing the various forms of
gendered being.
32 “I spell ‘transexual’ with one ‘s,’ a usage o f  activist informants who employed this spelling to resist the 
pathologizing implications o f  the medicalized two ‘s ’ transsexual’” (Valentine, Imagining 25).
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By respecting individual ontology, Serano and Currah demonstrate that a 
continuum/coalition framework offers a plausible solution to the binarism of identity 
politics; however, as Valentine notes, the continued importance of identity to civil rights 
has generated a political uniformity that mandates the use of this concept to achieve 
socio-political recognition. Consequently, the political viability of gender variance 
remains bound to a category that is currently preventing the representation of many 
nonnormative gender identities and practices. Though “transgender” is unable to 
instantiate all those marked by this label, its use as an identity is required by a political 
system that allocates rights and recognition according to “who one is,” and whether this 
understanding can be assimilated into an already existing model of cognizable 
citizenship. The notion of a shared identity thus serves as a threshold that must be 
surpassed if gender variant individuals are to gain admittance to the realm of the socially 
and politically intelligible; yet, the debate over “transgender’s” collective meaning 
indicates that anti-identity politics do not accomplish this task. Rather, this definitional 
dispute situates the dilemma of identity as a discursive consideration, when, as the above 
authors demonstrate, an ontological analysis is required to exceed the restrictions 
imposed by this present impasse. Accordingly, the issue of binarism will not be resolved 
through the redefinition of terminology, but instead calls for an examination of the 
premise upon which this duality is based; the problem of identity, and thus, political 
subjectivity, demands an investigation of the limits of human ontology.
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“I Cannot Be if You Are”: The Abjection of Gender Variance and the 
Reconceptualization of Subjectivity
To address the question of social and political viability, this chapter will 
interrogate the process of subject formation, demonstrating that the struggle to achieve 
this cultural status is not a matter of terminology, but of being. Though identity remains 
integral to socio-political recognition, one cannot be acknowledged as a viable subject if 
the foundation of one’s identity falls outside the parameters of normative subjectivity. 
Although various ideologies work together to solidify cultural perceptions of ontology, 
this chapter will argue that the primary foundation of human being is established through 
the process of gender attribution according to the binarism of the sex/gender paradigm. 
Consequently, gender variance is rendered incomprehensible according to the terms of 
intelligible subjectivity and is relegated to the realm of the “inhuman,” indicating that this 
mode of being is culturally abject. This infeasibility establishes nonnormative gender as a 
fundamental threat to viable subjectivity, demonstrating that this status cannot be attained 
unless the ideology that informs this abjection is reconceptualized. Accordingly, this 
chapter necessarily abstains from a further concentration on the dilemma posed by 
“transgender” to examine the concept of abjection and consider how the resignification of 
an ontological paradigm might be achieved. Given the abject’s destabilizing power, this 
chapter will explore the potential use of this concept as a political tool in the attempt to 
achieve a notion of subjectivity wherein gender variance is ontologically possible, and 
thus socially and politically viable.
1. The (Gendered) Human
In an afterword entitled “Are Transgender Rights /«human Rights” Kendall 
Thomas states that “[i]n the West, the notion of human subjectivity (of the human subject
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as such) has been erected on the fictional foundation of two fixed, unified, and coherent 
genders in one of which we are all inserted (by force if necessary) at birth” (316; 
emphasis in original). This dichotomous understanding of gender is founded upon the 
assumption that “sex is binary and biologically transparent [and] that gender maps easily 
and predictably onto sex” (Currah 24). The heteronormative ideology of reproduction and 
desire consolidates this paradigm (Butler, Gender Trouble 31), solidifying the causal 
relation between sex, gender, and sexuality, which functions as the framework through 
which human subjectivity is made possible. In summary: sex is culturally understood as 
the foundation that necessitates both gender and desire according to a binary or 
oppositional logic that presupposes two contrary, yet complementary, ontologies that 
form the basis of intelligible personhood.1 Accordingly, the process of gender attribution 
is mandatory, though the subject does not determine how it is marked nor the meaning of 
the label it receives (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 249); to be assigned a gender is the initial 
(and involuntary) rite of passage into cognizable personhood. As such, one’s “conformity
with the recognizable standards of gender intelligibility” is compulsory if one is to be
\
perceived as human (Butler, Gender Trouble 22). Judith Butler claims that “intelligible 
genders” are those that maintain the continuity between sex, gender, and desire (Gender 
Trouble 23), thus suggesting the internal or “natural” coherence of these categories
{Gender Trouble 31). Consequently, one must sustain and reflect the relations of the
\
sex/gender system if one is be considered “properly gendered” and subsequently qualify 
as human. • ■
1 These complementary ontologies are female/male.
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Butler claims that the standard by which we judge a person to be comprehensively 
gendered not only governs the recognizability of the human (Undoing 58), it constructs 
“a normative notion of what the body of a human must be” {Precarious 33). Due to the 
process of gender attribution, the body is established as gendered materiality, and it is 
through this lens that we come to understand the meaning of our corporeality as gendered 
beings (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 249). Accordingly, the body has been construed as the * 
material site of gender, and one’s compliance with the regulatory norms that have labeled 
the body as such determine one’s viability as a subject. That is, when one’s body adheres 
to or denotes the “standards of gender intelligibility,” one’s gender is revealed, and one’s 
status as “human” is socially perceived (Butler, Gender 22). As such, one must literally 
embody the cultural norms that dictate the codes of cognizable gender to achieve socio­
cultural subjectivity. The naturalization of this process occurs through the reproduction of 
these norms, which conceals the cultural and historical formation of bodies and subjects 
via the restrictions and requirements of the sex/gender paradigm (Butler, Bodies 2). 
However, because it is through the body that one’s gender is made manifest or 
“become[s] exposed to others” (Butler, Undoing 20), one’s mode of embodiment can 
either affirm or contest these norms according to whether one’s body signals the 
alignment of sex, gender, and subsequently sexuality. Bodies that do not signify these 
norms are necessarily relegated outside the bounds of normative subjectivity, as this 
materiality cannot be perceived as a reflection of “the human.” In short, “(normative) 
gendered embodiment is human embodiment and (normative) human being is gendered 
being” (Thomas 316).
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Though Butler notes that “we cannot think the human at all” without the 
presuppositional norms that inscribe the body as gendered (Undoing 57), this assertion 
does not negate the corporeal dimension of subjectivity or the facticity of the body. 
Instead, gender norms fundamentally tie notions of subjectivity to “the body” and the 
ability of the subject to materially reflect this normative conception of human being. 
Accordingly, “we do or do not recognize animate others as persons depending on whether 
or not we recognize a certain norm manifested in and by the body of that other” (Butler, 
Undoing 58). In this way, bodies function as material signs; the experience of 
embodiment, of being embodied as such, has both symbolic and phenomenological 
ramifications that inform external and internal perceptions of subjectivity. Elizabeth 
Grosz defines the body as follows: “The body is neither -  while also being both -  the 
private or the public, self or other, natural or cultural, psychical or social, instinctive or 
learned, genetically or environmentally determined” (23). Both biologically and 
culturally (re)produced, the body occupies an “indeterminable position,” which 
establishes it as a liminal site (Grosz 24); however, in spite of this liminality, we cannot 
“think” the body outside the prescriptive set of norms which determine what the body 
must be according to the conception of the human (Butler, Undoing 28). As such, social 
conditions of intelligibility define, regulate, and decipher the body, though the 
recognition of this process does not dismiss the materiality of the body, nor the pivotal 
role of the flesh as the site of gender, and subsequently, human subjectivity.
2. Abjection
According to Butler, the formation of the subject “requires the simultaneous 
production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet ‘subjects,’ but who form
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the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject” (Bodies 3). What is abject, then, is 
produced by, yet is radically excluded from and contrary to what determines the subject; 
it is “what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, 
rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (Kristeva 4). Though the abject is 
relegated outside the periphery of viable existence, its indecipherability inherently 
threatens to expose the illusory foundation upon which the subject is formed (Butler, 
Bodies 3). The boundaries that have been erected to maintain the integrity of the subject, 
and which serve as the gatekeepers of truth and meaning, are fundamentally violated by 
the abject, which reveals the constructedness of those boundaries. As such, meaning 
collapses (Kristeva 2) and a certain crisis in ontology occurs (Butler, Gender xi). The 
subject responds by vehemently rejecting that which compromises the grounds of its 
subjectivity in order to reaffirm the norms that govern its viability (Hook 19). Julia 
Kristeva claims this process functions as a safeguard, which serves to protect the subject 
from “[a] ‘something’ that I do not recognize as a thing.. .a reality that, if I acknowledge
it, annihilates me” (2). Thus, the abject is made a non-reality through the process of
' \
abjection in order to preserve our conception of “what is” or “what should be.”
This attempt to expel, reject, and repudiate that which threatens the dissolution of 
the subject is never a complete process, however (Hook 20). Although the abject is 
precluded from subjectivity, its construction is integral to the formation of the subject, 
which establishes this concept as “something rejected from which one does not part” 
(Kristeva 4). The constitution of the subject necessitates the creation of the abject as that 
which delineates the borders of the self, allowing for the ‘me/not me’ distinction that 
informs individual identity (Young, “Abjection” 207). Though the abject is rendered
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unintelligible, it functions as a condition of possibility for the subject; its exclusion from 
cultural viability serves as the subject’s “own founding repudiation” (Butler, Bodies 3), 
which solidifies the legitimacy of the subject and the grounds that generate this position. 
However, the necessity of abjection to the process of subject formation incidentally binds 
the abject to the subject as the subject’s “inner constitutive boundary... [or] internal 
limit” (McClintock 71). As such, the abject is never fully “outside” the subject despite its 
position of exclusion. It cannot be recognized as “object” or “other,” as it permeates the 
boundaries necessary to maintain subject/object and inside/outside distinctions (Grosz 
192). This ambiguity, in which the subject is implicated, signals the collapse of the 
borders initially established through the process of abjection in order to secure 
subjectivity. Hence, this process is never complete. Though abjection is integral to 
subject formation, its necessity reveals the instability of the grounds upon which the 
subject is forged. As a result, the continual expulsion of the abject is required to sustain 
the demarcations of truth and meaning.
Despite this status of perpetual exile, the threat posed by the abj ect remains
unvanquished and carries with it a potency that extends beyond the dissolution of the
subject. If the abject is capable of undermining the boundaries of meaning, then it is not
only subjectivity that is jeopardized by this concept; according to Derek Hook, “the
*
cultural symbolic itself is threatened” by the abject (25). Although Kristeva establishes 
abjection as a primal process that facilitates the subject’s bodily and ego differentiation, *3
“The ‘symbolic’ here refers to the broad realm o f  social order, signification and law that makes discourse 
possible” (Hook 15). Though this term is a psychoanalytic concept, Hook prefers to use “cultural 
symbolic,” which points to the historical specificity o f this realm (25).
3 Prior to the process o f abjection, the subject, or the pre-subjectal self, is “unable to distinguish between 
itself and its environment, possessing no awareness o f its own corporeal boundaries” (Hook 23). As infants,
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she also notes that the process of abjection and the abject itself are “[t]he primers 
of...culture” (2). This observation draws a parallel between the formation of the subject 
and the structural integrity of the cultural symbolic; both are (re)produced and validated 
by what is excluded from their parameters (Hook 28). Like the subject, the network of 
discourses that comprise the cultural symbolic are concomitantly challenged by what they 
expel (Hook 26). The indecipherable, the loathsome, the abhorrent, cannot be eliminated 
though the process of abjection, as the foundation of the culturally viable is dependent 
upon the production of the abject as its “constitutive outside” (Hook 28). As such, the 
abject can only be rejected and the threat of its formlessness remains intact. The potential 
of this destabilizing power thus signals an ontological crisis for the subject as well as “a 
crisis of [the cultural symbolic’s] exclusionary ordering systems” (Hook 25), which 
cannot contain, regularize, objectify, or obliterate the abject.
2.1 Abject Bodies
As the threat of this concept derives from the necessity of its exclusion, it is not
surprising that Kristeva claims its strength culminates when the subject “finds the
\
impossible within; when it finds that the impossible constitutes its very being, that it is 
none other than the abject” (5; emphasis in original). This recognition locates the abject 
inside the illusory bounds of the subject, as seeping past the ostensible inside/outside 
distinction the process of abjection is meant to maintain. Hook qualifies this assertion by 
claiming that the abject is at its most powerful when this distinction is lost with respect to
we are thought to forge a “syncretic unity” with our mothers, which characterizes this stage o f  existence as 
lacking clear borders and separations. For Kristeva, this state requires the violent rejection (i.e. abjection) 
o f this relation in order to establish the bodily boundaries o f  the self, allowing for self/other distinctions. As 
such, this initial process o f  abjection, or “primal differentiation,” is a necessary precondition o f one’s entry 
into the symbolic as a defined subject. For a further summary o f this process, see Hook 23.
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the bodily parameters of the subject (17). Citing Kristeva and Grosz,4 Hook establishes 
body fluids and excretions as the quintessential example of the abject as that which 
confounds the internal and external (17); by passing from the former to the latter via the 
subject, these bodily products retain an element of the subject in their expelled and 
abjected state, thus revealing the indissoluble tie that undermines the separation between 
the two (17 -18). Although this process of expulsion determines the physical boundaries 
of the subject, thereby establishing the internal and external (Butler, Gender 181 -  182), 
the by-product of this operation attests to the permeability of the body and its inability to 
contain or destroy that which compromises the coherence of the subject. Furthermore, the 
“irreducible materiality” (Grosz 194) of the body is exposed despite enduring Western 
notions of subjectivity as disembodied interiority (Grosz 3). Grosz claims that these 
abjected parts of the self not only “demonstrate the limits of subjectivity in the body” 
(194), they “assert the priority of the body over subjectivity” (194). Thus, the abject 
reduces the ostensible interiority of the subject to a base corporeality and exposes the 
liminality of the body. )
\
Hook claims that this affront to the bodily integrity of the subject elicits a violent 
response meant to restore the distinctions that ground the identity and autonomy of the 
self (19). Again citing Kristeva, he makes explicit the central role of corporal and 
affective reactions to the process of abjection (17). In the Powers o f Horror, Kristeva 
elaborates on the physical component of this process, claiming that the subject 
experiences an overall feeling of sickness and revulsion upon encountering the abject that 
results in a riot of nausea, gagging, and dizziness (3). The crisis experienced at the
4
Both Kristeva and Grosz discuss the abject quality o f  body fluids and excretions at length throughout 
their respective works on abjection.
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psychic and symbolic levels is thus mirrored on the corporeal level, inciting a visceral 
somatic effect meant to expel the “defiling otherness” conjured within the subject by the 
abject (Butler, Gender 182). The violence of this response reconstitutes the “proper” 
boundaries of the body by reproducing “the immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separate from another body in order to be” (Kristeva 10). This primal 
distinction, which occurs on the corporal level, indicates that the bodily parameters of the 
self function as “the first contours of the subject” (Butler, Gender 181). As such, it is the 
differentiation of the body that allows for subjectivity, and it is the abject that draws 
attention to this fact by recalling the rejected parts of the self, those odious aspects 
designated as such to establish the proper bounds of the subject (Butler, Gender 181 — 
182). The destabilizing threat imposed by this “recollection” at once produces psychic, 
symbolic, and somatic effects; however, ‘[t]he original and primary ‘surface’ of the 
abject’s realization is the body” (Hook 17). By disclosing the liminality of the soma, the 
abject concomitantly reveals and disrupts the corporeality of subjectivity, which
undermines the differentiation of the subject. Given that the body is the site of
\
subjectivity, it is necessarily the site of abjection.
Although the somatic crisis experienced by the subject indicates the significance 
of the body to the process of abjection, abjected individuals exemplify the centrality of 
the corporal to this process. When a body fails to reflect the regulatory norms that 
determine the material bounds of the subject, this “difference” is perceived as an 
aberration, which prohibits any claim to subjectivity by diminishing the body to a deviant 
state of physicality (Young, Justice 123). Reduced to their corporal specificities, these 
“divergent” bodies are conceived of as “ugly, dirty, defiled, impure, contaminated, or
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sick” (Young, Justice 123) within the cultural symbolic. Because the flesh has been 
construed as a sign of subjectivity, any somatic component located outside the parameters 
of the normative body is subsequently rendered abject. Iris Marion Young claims that the 
various persons consigned to this domain of corporal defilement “fulfill the function of 
what lies just on the other side of the borders of the self, too close for comfort and 
threatening to cross or dissolve the border” (“Abjection” 208). The threat issued by these 
abjected persons makes clear that the conditions of possibility cannot allow certain 
permutations of embodied existence without jeopardizing the position of the subject. 
However, it is imperative to note that these particular configurations of the abject are 
arbitrary, as the abject itself “assumes specific shapes and different codings according to 
the various ‘symbolic systems’” that warrant its production (Kristeva 68). As the abject is 
socially determined, no thing, object, person, or environment intrinsically possesses this 
quality, yet may potentially “‘manifest’ the abject for the subject” depending on cultural 
norms and restrictions (Hook 20). The level of impact and the severity of the response 
vary according to the austerity of the prohibition that generates the abject in a given 
scenario (Kristeva 69). Though denigrated bodies are not inherently abject, those marked 
as deviant and ambiguous exemplify the utmost strength of this concept since the 
limitations imposed by the normative body dictate one’s access to subjectivity.
2.2 The Abjection of Gender Variance
The ability of the aberrant body to disturb the material bounds of the subject is 
revealed when the subject is unable to objectify this divergent corporeality, and instead 
perceives an element of itself within the fleshy contours of the abject. “[N]o longer;
t
unambiguously Other” (Young, “Abjection” 209), these bodies cannot be properly
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defined, differentiated, and controlled as “distinctly identifiable creatures with degenerate 
and inferior natures” (Young, “Abjection” 209). Rather, like those abjected parts of the 
self, aberrant bodies seep across me/not me, inside/outside distinctions, destabilizing the 
foundation that enables the subject to distinguish itself from others. Young claims that the 
concomitant desire to differentiate oneself and the recognition that “the Other is not so 
different from me” (“Abjection” 209), generates the situation in which abjected 
individuals “threaten to cross over the border of the subject’s identity” (“Abjection” 209). 
The crisis that emerges from this psychic conflict culminates in the revelation that “I 
cannot be if you are”; to acknowledge the potential subjectivity of an abjected individual 
is to radically undermine one’s own position as a subject in addition to the ideological 
restrictions that regulate subjectivity within the cultural symbolic. To avert this crisis and 
reestablish the legitimacy of normative subjectivity, the subject responds with a phobic 
loathing that endeavours to invalidate the abjected person by rendering this individual 
non-human (Young, “Abjection” 208).
Given that the subject has been established in Western culture as “implicitly
\
white, male, youthful, heterosexual, [and] middle-class” (Grosz 188), numerous bodies 
may be perceived as abject, including racialized bodies, disabled bodies, female bodies, 
homosexual bodies, obese bodies, impoverished bodies and so forth (Young, Justice 375 
-  376). That a body can be recognized as homosexual or impoverished not only indicates 
that these various social categories directly involve the body, it demonstrates that we 
effectively wear our subjectivity, or conversely, our non-subjectivity. It should also be
i I
noted that these categories are not mutually exclusive, but rather constitute one another 
(Grosz 20), which complicates the level of abjection an individual may experience if s/he
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is perceived as having numerous abject qualities. However, the intersectionality that 
results from the creation of both the abject and the subject does not negate the claim that
human subjectivity is made possible through the production and binary division of the
\  1
sexes (Thomas 316). Although the construction of the “proper” body is consolidated by 
manifold exclusions, thus creating a variegated domain of the abject, subjectivity cannot 
be achieved without the compulsory gender assignment that serves as the primary 
foundation through which one is recognized as a subject (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 250). 
The primal differentiation of the body manifests on the symbolic level as the gendering of 
the subject, which functions as the initial demarcation of culturally intelligible 
personhood.5 Without this distinction, we literally cannot perceive the body as a 
reflection of normative human subjectivity; as Butler states, “subject-formation is 
dependent on the prior operation of legitimating gender norms,” which are contingent 
upon their embodiment (Bodies 232). Any form of corporeality that exists outside of this 
binary framework is promptly abjected and rendered unintelligible.
The cultural abnegation of gender variant bodies indicates the incomprehensibility
\
attributed to nonnormative gender, as it attempts to expel what the symbolic fails to 
recognize as viable. Kristeva states, “in that thing that no longer matches and therefore no 
longer signifies anything, I behold the breaking down of a world that has erased its 
borders” (4). By deviating from the sex/gender paradigm, gender variant bodies 
effectively sever biological sex from gender expression, a form of embodiment which has 
no cultural referent and which destabilizes the norms that result in the initial
5 Thus, there is a parallel formation o f  the subject in the psychic and symbolic realms; however, the 
symbolic process o f subject formation necessarily establishes gender variance as abject to allow for the . 
distinct categories o f female and male.
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differentiation of the subject. In failing to “match” sex with gender, gender variant 
bodies, in whatever manifestation these bodies may take, are the veritable sites where 
meaning collapses for both the subject and the cultural symbolic.6 This meaninglessness 
is then transferred to the subject through the confounding recognition that the body is 
liminal, but is also the very seat of subjectivity, or rather, that sex and gender are not 
conjoined, but that the enforcement of this partnership informs one’s entitlement to the 
category “human.” This revelation discloses “the constructedness of the natural order” 
(Stryker, “Frankenstein” 250),7 which divests the sex/gender paradigm of its ostensible 
meaning. Consequently, the demarcation of the self is invalidated and the subject 
becomes indistinguishable from the abject. Because the normative body serves as the sitei
of subjectivity, the somatic ambiguity of nonnormative gender is able to produce this 
effect, thus representing the most potent of the abject. To remedy this radical 
transgression and reestablish the legitimacy of one’s personhood, the subject must 
reassert what the symbolic already confirms, namely “that certain kinds of ‘identities’ 
cannot ‘exist’ -  that is, those in which gender does not follow from sex” (Butler, Gender 
24). By affirming the infeasibility of gender variance through the process of abjection, 
the subject temporarily restores the cultural foundation that grounds its subjectivity. As 
such, the identities, practices, and embodiments of gender nonconformity are rendered 
“unreal” to preserve the normative notion of “the human.”
6 Christopher Shelly notes that although nonnormative gender identities are culturally abject, some 
expressions and practices are abjected more than others (53). These varying levels o f abjection are often 
related to the “visibility” o f  one’s gender variance (53), though other, more complex factors may also 
inform the changing austerity o f  this abjection. Though this variability warrants further investigation, it 
supports Kristeva’s argument that different prohibitions generate different results. As some forms o f  gender 
variance may be more restricted than others (it has been suggested that transwomen experience more 
transphobia than transmen [Shelley 51 -  53]), higher levels o f  abjection are consequently experienced.7
The “natural order” Stryker refers to should be understood as an order o f existence “naturalized” through 
ideology as opposed to biology.
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2.3 Dehumanization
When the subject encounters a gender variant individual as a manifestation of the 
abject, a dual process of dehumanization occurs that involves both the subject and the 
abjected person. Although the nonhuman status attributed to gender variance within the 
symbolic precipitates the dehumanization of gender variant individuals, the abjection of 
the subject occurs despite the cultural sanctions that validate its humanity. By disrupting 
the continuity of the sex/gender paradigm, the abjected person is capable of undermining 
the authority of the symbolic, and reducing the subject to an amorphous corporeality 
devoid of meaning. However, this ability to diminish the humanity of the subject by 
exposing the liminality of the body is only possible because the abject itself is 
meaningless; with no cultural referent through which to understand gender variant bodies, 
these bodies can only be perceived as an aberrant materiality that presents the subject 
with its own corporeal ambiguity.8 This shared somatic incoherence indicates that the 
dehumanization of the subject and the abjected person manifests on a bodily level; during
an encounter, the gender variant individual is reduced to a deviant corporeal state and the
\
subject is stripped of its primary differentiation. As the body is the site of subjectivity and 
abjection, it is necessarily the site of dehumanization as experienced through the process 
of abjection. However, due to the psychic and symbolic effects of this process, the 
inhumanity of the subject extends beyond the somatic level, disclosing itself though the
g
This effect is restricted to the perception o f  gender variance as a manifestation o f the abject and should 
not be read as conclusive. ^
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realization of the abject within, and the violence that transpires to rectify this boundary 
violation.9
Kristeva claims that the subject is concomitantly abjected by the process through 
which it endeavours to distinguish itself (3). She states, “I expel myself, I spit myself out,
I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself (3; 
emphasis in original). Although this outcome may appear contradictory, the abjection of 
the subject, or rather, the pre-subjectal self, is fundamental to its cultural formation. In 
order to achieve subjectivity within the symbolic, one must eject and transvaluate 
“something originally part of identity into a defiling otherness” (Butler, Gender 182). 
Thus, the demarcation and expulsion of the abject parts of the self determines the cultural 
intelligibility of the subject and the validity of its humanness. However, as Kristeva 
states, the subject can never fully sever itself from the realm of the abject, and the 
recognition that these abhorrent qualities persist despite their rejection indicates that the 
abject indelibly resides within,10 1disclosing the inhumanity of the subject. When faced
with the possibility of gender variance, this realization occurs, forcing the subject to
\.
admit to the permeability of its own body and the abjection this incoherence signifies.11 
The discontinuity that the subject apprehends within itself exposes the sex/gender 
paradigm as a fallacy, and effectively collapses the subject/abject distinction it once 
perceived.12 As such, the subject’s constructed humanity and abjected inhumanity are
9 This claim is based on the assumption that “humanity” or “humanness” is, or should be, a fundamentally 
non-violent concept. For a further elaboration on the inhumanity o f  violence, see Thomas 319.
10 Or rather, that the notion o f  interiority and separation is an illusion.
11 Again, it is worth repeating that this situation would occur when gender variance is perceived as a
manifestation o f the abject.12This distinction does not denote a binary relation between the subject and the abject, but rather the 
illusory belief that the subject has successfully expelled the abject parts o f the self.
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simultaneously revealed through the recognition that corporeal indeterminacy is a 
fundamental component of the self. The need to reject this ambiguity simply confirms 
that the subject must “spit itself out” in order to (re)establish its “proper” self as 
determined by the cultural symbolic.
To avert the ontological crisis that results from this realization, the subject
attempts to restore the grounds of its subjectivity by transposing its inhumanity onto that
which gives rise to the abject within itself. By affirming the dehumanization of the
abjected individual, the subject exorcises its own abjection and reestablishes its claim to
“the human.” This process, as both Kristeva and Hook demonstrate, transpires as a
violent revolt meant to delineate the boundaries of the self. The aggression directed
towards the abjected person replicates the originary violence through which the subject
differentiates itself, reestablishing a border between the subject and the abject, the human
and the aberrant. The abjection of the self is thus alleviated, if only provisionally, by the
abjection of another, whose dehumanization is confirmed by the violence of this process.
The manifestation of this violence can be seen in the somatic effects of revulsion and the
phobic loathing the subject experiences upon encountering an abjected individual, yet can
also escalate to emotional and physical assault given the potency of this person’s cultural
abjection. Stryker aptly summarizes the entire process with respect to the dehumanization
of gender variant individuals. She states, !
Because most people have great difficulty recognizing the humanity of another 
person if they cannot recognize that person’s gender, the gender-changing person 
can evoke in others a primordial fear of monstrosity, or loss of humanness. That 
gut-level fear can manifest itself as hatred, outrage, panic, or disgust, which may 
then translate into physical or emotional violence directed against the person who 
is perceived as not-quite-human. (History 6)
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Although gender variant individuals experience this aggression at the hands of the 
subject, this violence merely reinforces the inhuman status already attributed to the 
former, as opposed to being the primary source of their dehumanization. Due to the 
process of gender attribution, a “gendering violence” culturally reproduces the violence 
of primary differentiation (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 250), indicating that the 
dehumanization of gender variant persons initially occurs on the level of social discourse 
(Butler, Undoing 25). The subject’s aggression subsequently reiterates “the message of 
dehumanization whichIs already at work in the culture” (Butler, Undoing 25).
Though this violent rejection consolidates the inhumanity of the abjected person, 
Thomas claims that the subject is complicit in its own dehumanization by enacting this 
abjection (319). That is, the subject does not secure its humanity through this process, but 
rather affirms its inhumanity by endeavouring to dehumanize another. Thomas also 
confirms that the violence of this objective proceeds from an ideological foundation, 
which sanctions the subject’s behaviour by generating the realm of the abject. He states, 
“the rampant incidence of physical violence against [gender variant] people...has been 
provoked or justified by the discourse of dehumanization” (Thomas 314; emphasis in 
original). As the abjection of nonnormative gender within the symbolic underlies the 
subject’s violence towards gender variant individuals, the subject’s inhumanity results 
from the very nexus which permits its cultural viability. Thus, “the ‘inhumanitarianism’ 
of the human” (Thomas 319), which is disclosed through this violent behaviour, is an 
effect of a signifying order that does not permit the segregation of gender from sex. As 
Butler states, “[t]his violence emerges from a profound desire to keep the order of binary 
gender natural or necessary, to make of it a structure.. .that no human can oppose, and
'\
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still remain human” (Undoing35). The subject’s attempt to “enforce” gender binarism
and subsequently expel its own inhumanity may temporarily restore the borders of the
self; however, the violence required to reinstate this illusion ultimately divests the subject
of its humanity. As such, the dehumanization of the subject is ultimately not the result of
an encounter with the abject, but is the outcome of a social order which mandates that the
11subject abject itself to achieve and maintain the cultural status of human.
The dual process of dehumanization that results from the necessity of abjection 
demonstrates the double paradox generated by the formation of the subject. Through the 
abjection and subsequent dehumanization of gender variance, human subjectivity is made 
possible; however, this very process imbues the abject with the power to dismantle the 
ideological structures its exclusion is meant to secure. Furthermore, the attempt to 
extinguish this threat and reaffirm the grounds that validate one’s subjectivity inevitably 
confirms the subject’s own inhumanity. Each outcome indicates that the distinction 
between these categories is based upon an illusory foundation; as the subject and the 
abject are simultaneously produced, their dehumanization necessarily shares the same: 
ideological grounds, which further illustrates the link between them. This paradox 
indicates that the symbolic functions as “ a world in which human beings are 
‘constrained’ into becoming inhuman” (Thomas 319), both through the process of gender 
attribution and the attempt to defend this process through violence. Yet, despite this 
contradiction, abjection is still required, as it functions as a condition of possibility for the 13
13 This explanation in no way suggests that the subject is alleviated from its accountability for the violence 
it enacts against a gender variant person, but rather endeavours to elucidate the potential cause for this 
groundless aggression.
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subject. If this concept were to be eliminated, our ontological structures would : 
necessarily have to change.
3. Reconceptualization
Although gender attribution reproduces the primal differentiation of the subject on 
the symbolic level, the social articulation of sex and gender distinguishes this formation 
of the subject from the innate processes that allow the subject to delineate the borders of 
the self. As Hook notes, “abjection is not simply a primal process of bodily and ego 
differentiation, but equally a top-down production of power through which the structures 
of a given society are affirmed and solidified through the systematic generation of a class 
of disqualified abject subjects” (34). The social construction of both the abject and the 
subject illustrates that these categories are not solely the effects of a psychic impulse, but 
rather are also reliant upon their cultural interpretation. The way these concepts translate 
in a social context is thus particular to the prevailing ideology; though primal 
differentiation necessitates the process of abjection, what constitutes the subject and the 
abject within the symbolic is not inherent to these categories, but is an expression of the 
historically and culturally specific social discourses that produce these classifications. 
Accordingly, the subject and the abject are not fixed in their representations, indicating 
that the cultural foundation which both segregates and binds these terms is also subject to 
change. Given the formative relationship between the subject and the abject, these two 
concepts necessarily transform in tandem, and their modification can only occur if the 
premise of their creation alters or dissipates. An ideological shift is thus required for the 
cultural significance of the subject and the abject to change.
In the case of gender binarism and the subsequent abjection of gender variance, an 
entirely new conception of “the human” would have to be put forth to disestablish the 
violence that results from this dualistic framework. The subject and the abject generated 
by this concept reveal the stringent limitations of the human, demonstrating the present 
exclusivity of this category and the need to resignify the parameters that maintain this 
distinction at the expense of abjected individuals. Butler argues that this process of 
resignification becomes requisite when “our most fundamental categories” encounter the 
limits of the foundation from which they emerge (Undoing 38). When the sex/gender 
paradigm is confronted with gender variance, the limitations of the former are 
indisputably exposed, establishing the human as a concept based on faulty grounds that 
cannot assimilate nor abolish nonnormative gender expression. The cultural abjection of 
the latter mandates a violent expulsion of gender nonconformity to re-secure the illusory 
bounds of the human; however, the resignification of this category serves as a viable 
alternative to the abjection that currently allows for and defines the very premise of 
human being. Because the process of abjection is required to maintain a binary 
framework, the reconceptualization of the human outside this polarity provides an 
opportunity to conceive of a subject position that does not necessitate the creation of an
abject domain. Although gender binarism presently prohibits this configuration of the
\
human, the ideological basis of this paradigm indicates that this restriction is far from 
permanent, as sex and gender are socially produced concepts rather than organic facts. 
Since the foundation of these categories is culturally generated and mutable, the violence 
issued by this dualism can be countered by a more “capacious,” and subsequently less 
violent conception of subjectivity, where gender variance is no longer perceived as an
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ontological threat (Butler, Undoing 35). Nevertheless, the resignification of the human 
cannot take effect unless the ideology that grounds this concept is fundamentally altered.
Butler suggests that the abject’s destabilizing power can be utilized as a means 
through which to achieve this ideological shift, thereby opening the human to the process 
of reaiticulation. She states, “when the unreal lays claim to reality, or enters into its 
domain, something other than a simple assimilation into prevailing norms can and does 
take place. The norms themselves can become rattled, display their instability, and 
become open to resignification” (Undoing 27 -  28). Though both Kristeva and Butler 
agree that the abject or “unreal” destabilizes symbolic meaning, Butler further posits the 
political utility of this disturbance, claiming that the abject’s disruptive power can be 
perceived “not as a permanent contestation of social norms. , .but rather as a critical 
resource in the struggle to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy and 
intelligibility” {Bodies3). As Hook notes, the abject not only challenges the basis of 
subjectivity, it threatens the ideological structures that comprise the symbolic (25), thus 
exposing the grounds of cultural signification as vulnerable to change despite their 
construction as static. The need to repudiate and expel the abject to maintain the integrity 
of our ontological categories indicates that the danger posed by this concept is not merely 
the dissolution of meaning, but rather the resignification of what is “real.” By manifesting 
“that-which-should-not-exist” according to the logic of a particular culture, the abject at 
once derails the intelligible and signals a surge of potential other meanings that is 
presently prohibited by the current system. Though indecipherable from a normativizing 
lens, this challenge marks the abject as a prospective source through which “different 
codes of intelligibility” maybe established (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 249). In subverting
60
the order upheld within the symbolic, the abject is not only capable of destabilization; “a 
specific reworking of abjection into political agency” indicates how the disruption of an 
ideological paradigm can heed the production of new and other forms of signification 
(Butler, Bodies 21).
Yet, how does one harness what Thomas has termed the “potential, positive 
force” of the abject (319), given the radical marginalization of everything that 
(dis)qualifies under this label? Although the abject’s disruptive power is 
inextinguishable, it is the result of a fundamental exclusion from the realm of viability, 
making this concept an unlikely political tool; however, there are those who intentionally 
“walk and work through the idea of the inhuman” in order to seize the potential of the 
abject as a tactic to counter the hegemonic discourse of “the human” (Thomas 319). By 
asserting the invalidity of the abject as a form of resistance, this concept can give rise to a 
“reverse-discourse” wherein the repudiation of the abject is overturned to deliberately 
contest the regulatory terms of subjectivity (Butler, Bodies 232).14 Stryker extends the 
scope of this strategy by claiming that it is “imperative to take up.. .a set of practices that 
precipitates one’s exclusion from a naturalized order of existence” if other forms of 
subjectivity are to subsist (“Frankenstein” 249; my emphasis). Paradoxically, then, the 
abject can sanction the existence of alternative subjectivities if the power of this concept 
is utilized to oppose the restrictions of normativity. Rather than the perpetual negation of 
abjected individuals, the grounds of the subject are purposely confronted and disputed via 
the cultural stigma bound to the abject, which in turn “becomes the source of
14 Because the abject is not in a binary relationship with the subject, the use o f this concept as a tactic o f  
resistance does not result in an inversion o f a dualistic paradigm, but rather requires a paradigm change. As 
this strategy radically destabilizes the binarism made possible through abjection, it allows for other notions 
o f subjectivity outside binary relations (self/other, female/male etc.).
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transformative power” (Stryker, “Frankenstein” 249). This deliberate contestation 
signifies a move away from abjection into political agency and potential subjectivity 
through the process of resignification.
The modification of the abject through this fervent opposition necessarily 
demands the transformation of the subject and the ideology that founds these two 
concepts. To allow for different subjectivities, the dualistic framework though which the 
subject is formed must fundamentally alter so that the exclusivity of this binarism yields 
to a plurality of subject positions. Yet, the bodily and ego differentiation of the subject is 
still required due to the process of primal differentiation, which is made possible through 
the function of abjection. How, then, can subjectivity be conceived without relying upon 
the polarity generated by this process to determine the cultural signification of this 
concept? Difference continues to be necessary to establish individual subjectivity; 
however, Kim Toffoletti argues that this difference need not be founded upon binaristic 
segregation. She claims that “a proliferation of differences” can serve to replace this 
duality while maintaining the individuation that makes difference possible (104). Because 
this type of difference “is no longer understood relative to a dominant term” (103), it 
directly threatens how meaning is presently created and perceived (103). By freeing 
difference from an oppositional paradigm, subjectivity is no longer dependent upon the 
subordination of an “other” for definition, which suggests that the violence of abjection 
does not have to be replicated within the symbolic in order to determine intelligible 
personhood. As a psychic process, primal differentiation goes unaltered, indicating that 
the body remains the site of subjectivity; however, as neither the subject nor the abject
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are fixed, the cultural manifestation of subjectivity is mutable, allowing for the 
“proliferation of differences” as a plausible alternative to binarism.
Given that the body distinguishes the subject, it is not surprising that Toffoletti 
elucidates her conception of difference by exploring the shifting corporeal boundaries of 
“post-human” configurations (89).15 Although the various forms of posthumanity she 
evaluates are simulated images, Toffoletti claims that these portrayals confound 
“essentialist notions of the body and the natural, occasioning a range of possibilities for 
what might constitute subjectivity beyond the [normative] limits of the body and identity” 
(89). The corporeal ambiguity that these depictions intentionally flaunt directly 
challenges the ideology that informs “anatomical being [so that it] is no longer [perceived 
as] a stable referent” (88). Accordingly, ontological categories such as sexuality, race, 
and gender are reconceputalized as “fluid and displaced terms” (Toffoletti 89), allowing 
for numerous other types of being to exist outside the confines of these classifications. 
However, Toffoletti demonstrates that this rupture in signification and subsequent 
proliferation of possible subjectivities requires the resistance, and ultimately the 
resignification, of the body. Because the subject is made possible by its corporeal 
distinction, the contestation of normative subjectivity must occur at the site where this 
concept is made manifest; to change “the human,” a rearticulation of the body and the 
ideology that grounds the soma is required. By opposing the restrictions of the human 
through the flesh, the various forms of embodiment negated by this prototype are 
demonstrated as both plausible and viable despite the system that calls for their exclusion.
15 Toffoletti defines the “post-human” as “a boundary form that calls into question ontological 
configurations o f  difference” (82). The somatic ambiguity o f  the post-human is meant to situate this 
concept beyond normative conceptions o f  “the human” as based on a binary system and the subsequent 
restrictions o f this duality.
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This corporeal defiance challenges a “paradigm of difference” based on a binaristic 
framework, while demanding a model “that can account for the experiences of different 
bodies” (Toffoletti 105). With this paradigmatic change, the body is refigured so that 
“altogether new conceptions of corporeality” redefine material being (Grosz 22), 
resulting in new conceptions of subjectivity. As the body is recast, so the human is 
remade.
Although Toffoletti’s analysis centers upon the post-human image, her argument 
can be extended to the power invested in the aberrant body by the process of abjection. If 
the threat posed by this denigrated materiality is utilized as a resource by an abjected 
individual, the body as the site of abjection becomes the site of resistance in the struggle 
to combat restrictive norms. As a political tactic, this opposition holds numerous 
implications for the various social categories that determine the signification of the body; 
however, it is the refutation of the sex/gender paradigm via the somatic expression of 
gender variance that possesses the ability to alter the foundation of the subject. By laying 
claim to subjectivity through the fundamental disruption of its premise, gender variant 
individuals demonstrate their potential to override the process of abjection and assert the 
validity of diverse embodiments through a corporeal insurgence.16 Grosz defines this 
process as follows: “Where one body.. .takes on the function of model or ideal, the
16 Though this argument may appear to correspond with the objectives o f queer politics, this effect does not 
necessitate that one take up a queer subject position or identify as queer. Rather, the abjection o f  
nonnormative gender indicates that a gender variant individual can achieve this effect by asserting their 
embodiment, gender expression, and identity (in whatever manifestation) as a valid mode o f  being. 
Although nonnormative gender, in and o f  itself, is not intrinsically subversive, its cultural prohibition 
indicates that gender variant bodies, identities, and practices necessarily challenge the foundation o f “the . 
human.” Furthermore, the contestation o f normative subjectivity does not mandate the elimination o f 
gender normative identities, but rather demands an ontological paradigm that allows for multiple gender 
identifications as valid expressions o f human subjectivity.
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human body, for all other types of body, its domination may be undermined through a 
defiant affirmation of a multiplicity, a field of differences, of other kinds of bodies and 
subjectivities” (19). Given that gender nonconformity has no singular manifestation or 
expression (Serano 29), gender variant embodiments can take unlimited different forms, 
resulting in a proliferation of various subjectivities that not only expose the limitations of 
gender binarism, they also necessitate a new ideological framework with which to 
understand subjectivity. By asserting gender variant bodies as legitimate foundations 
from which to establish a subject position, the sex/gender paradigm is effectively 
debunked as the sole means though which subjectivity is achieved.
To attain this ideological shift, however, it is not simply a matter of claiming 
gender variance as a viable form of embodiment. Again, it is the contestation of the 
sex/gender paradigm through the lived corporeal resistance of gender variant bodies that 
is required if the grounds of subjectivity are to change. Butler makes clear that the 
resignification of a norm results from its inefficacy, and states that “the question of 
subversion, of working the weakness o f the norm, becomes a matter of inhabiting the 
practices of its rearticulation” {Bodies 237; emphasis in original). Because gender variant 
bodies are the sites where the limitation of the sex/gender paradigm is revealed, the lived 
expression of this embodiment and the concomitant claim to subjectivity take effect as a 
substantive reconceptualization of the human. However, the symbolic actualization of 
this claim is contingent upon the physical manifestation of its premise, as the body is the 
seat of subjectivity. Accordingly, the body’s reconfiguration is imperative to “the process 
of remaking the human” (Butler, Undoing 2); yet, this motion towards change should not 
be perceived as a normativizing gesture.
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The objective of harnessing the destabilizing power of gender variant bodies is 
not to incorporate nonnormative gender into an already established ontology, thus 
creating a more inclusive model; indeed, this would not be possible, as this threat 
specifically produces an ontological crisis incapable of recognizing the abject without the 
structural collapse of symbolic meaning. However, neither is this intention to substitute 
one prototype for another, as this would merely establish an additional version of “the 
human” that, although different, would continue to generate an abject realm by way of 
exclusivity. Rather, this reconceptualization of “the human” involves “an insurrection at 
the level of ontology” (Butler, Precarious 33), which mandates the ideological change 
required to displace binarism and resignify the meaning bound to subjectivity. Butler 
claims that if this insurgence possesses a normative aspect, it consists in the move away 
from abjection “toward[s] a more possible future ... [wherein] the very meaning of what 
counts as a valued and valuable body in the world” does not rely upon the violence of 
exclusion (Bodies 21 -  22). In living this rearticulation, gender variant individuals 
literally reconfigure the boundaries of “the human,” signaling the proliferation of 
different subjectivities through the resistance and affirmation of the aberrant body.
Transgender Human Rights: Overcoming Identity and Abjection through the Parameters
of the Law
Though the reconceptualization of subjectivity necessitates a paradigmatic sea 
change at the level of ontology, it also requires that this transformation take place through 
the practical designations of the law. Arguing that the formation of “the human” through 
human rights mirrors the process of subject formation, this chapter will demonstrate that 
the resignification of human subjectivity must inevitably occur within the parameters of 
the law as part of the overall reconceptualization of this concept. As human rights 
confirm one’s status as “human” according to the state, the struggle to achieve these 
rights is integral to the move away from cultural abjection towards politically viable 
subjectivity. In effect, this process cannot be complete without obtaining rights, as this 
legislation establishes “the human” as a legal category, consolidating the ideology that 
informs this concept by establishing it as law. Consequently, the sex/gender paradigm is 
both mandated and regulated by the state, which reifies the “inhuman” status of gender 
variant individuals. To address this legislated inhumanity, this chapter will examine how 
transgender rights activists have taken up the cultural abjection of gender variance as a 
political tool to resignify the legal bounds of “the human,” thus attempting to change 
ontology through the acquisition of rights. This strategy will be positioned as an attempt 
to transcend the limitations of identity politics and present conceptions of human 
subjectivity by serving as an example of the various solutions explored in the first two 
chapters to overcome the issues posed by each obstacle. Though the endeavour to gain 
access to the law is only one tactic to address these concerns, this chapter will argue that 
transgender human rights create new possibilities for politically viable subjectivity 
outside the restrictions and exclusions of binarism.
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1. “The Human” in Human Rights
In Human Rights and Empire Costas Douzinas challenges the universal 
applicability of “the human” as represented in human rights discourse, treaties, and 
legislation. Though the widespread inclusivity of this term is meant to surpass the 
particularities that are deemed to differentiate individuals (54),1 Douzinas claims that this 
“universality” is grounded in a series of distinctions that indicate “the human” is 
empirically located rather than transcendental. To elucidate this point, Douzinas reiterates 
the general description of this concept in human rights discourse, claiming that “the 
human” “appears without differentiation...in his [sic] nakedness and simplicity, united 
with all others in an empty nature deprived of substantive characteristics except for his 
free will, reason and soul -  the universal elements of human essence” (52). He further 
states that this “essence” is conveyed as absolute, inalienable, and “the attribute of each 
individual who is the real subject” (52). Though this universality seems to suggest some 
shared ontological quality or “common ‘factor X’” (54), Douzinas argues that this 
definition indicates that “the human” is premised upon a particular prototype that has 
been comprehensively applied. This model (as per the description above) is explicitly 
gendered as male,* 2 and is defined by individual free will, reason, and soul, qualities that
/  This perception o f “the human” implicitly indicates that “difference” is the basis o f human inequality, and 
that a commonality must be constructed and shared if  all humans are to be equally valued.
2
Though Douzinas is aware that the “man” in the “rights o f man” is presently used as a generic term for all 
viable persons despite their gender, he is also acutely aware that “the human” has been founded upon 
Western philosophical and religious traditions that have excluded non-male persons (specifically cissexual 
women) from subjectivity. This ideological history is revealed as “the human” is still referred to as male 
with the use o f  male pronouns, and as such, can still be read'as male, regardless o f the more inclusive 
understanding o f this concept. Though cissexual women have been incorporated into “the human” (for 
instance, the creation o f  “women’s human rights”), and are accordingly granted this status in the law, the 
cultural perception o f “the human” is still predominately male, as the Western subject informs this legal 
category. This understanding also denotes the absence o f  other non-male subjects from this concept. (The 
term “cissexual” refers to the alignment o f  one’s birth assigned sex and gender according to the sex/gender 
paradigm [Serano 12]).
are fundamentally rooted in the patriarchal liberal political philosophy and Christian 
theology propagated by the West (52). The common “human” essence these attributes 
represent further reveals the cultural imperialism that informs this concept and 
subsequently subordinates other perceptions of human being. Each distinction works 
together to affirm the “real subject” of human rights, illustrating that this “absolute and 
inalienable” definition has been founded upon the pillars of Western subjectivity.
Because “the human” is grounded in Western notions of the subject, it is 
unsurprising when Douzinas claims that “the empirical person who enjoys the ‘rights of 
man’... is and remains a well-off citizen, a heterosexual, white, urban male” (54). Though 
“the human” is a relatively abstract concept, its concrete manifestation further 
demonstrates that human rights have been used to consolidate a specific perception of 
humanity already present in Western culture. Accordingly, these rights have reified a 
cultural concept by establishing “the human” as an official legal category. By delineating 
and legitimizing the parameters of recognizable being, human rights have effectively , 
constructed “the human” through the lens of the state (Douzinas 45); however, as 
Douzinas notes, it is “the definition of the human that determines the substance and scope 
of [these] rights” (51). Although this concept is concretized through the law, “human 
rights.. .always rely on a certain conception of the human” to precede, ground, and justify 
the entitlements these rights ostensibly guarantee, as well as their significance and range 
(Balfour & Cavada 286; emphasis in original). As such, the legal construction of “the 
human” requires an ideological premise that the law can substantiate, and thus bring into 
effect. Given that this concept is based on perceptions of Western subjectivity, human
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rights have established these notions as the standards through which individuals are 
legally confirmed as human or denied access to this category (Douzinas 108). 
Consequently, those who fall outside the parameters of the Western subject indicate that 
the notion of a shared human essence is an impossibility, as is the widespread 
applicability of human rights.
The present definition of “the human” not only undoes the universality attributed 
to this category, it also demonstrates the underlying logic upon which this concept is 
forged. To solidify the lawful boundaries of concrete personhood, certain individuals are 
necessarily excluded from this process, indicating that “the human” as well as “the 
inhuman” are legally constructed categories. Douzinas confirms this exclusion, claiming 
that “inhuman” or “surplus” persons “are the indispensable precondition of human rights 
but at the same time the living.. .proof of their impossibility. The law not only cannot 
understand the surplus subject, its very operation prevents the emergence of such a 
subject” (108). As a result, “inhuman” individuals are rendered outside the confines and 
protections of the law, indicating that their lives are unrecognizable to the state. Because 
this exclusion is requisite to the legislative construction of “the human,” this legal process 
mirrors the formation of the subject through the process of abjection; by necessitating the 
creation of an inhuman realm of existence to confirm the lawful parameters of 
subjectivity, human rights affirm the humanity of some via the inhumanity of others. 
Although this paradox compromises the definition of “the human,” the cultural notions of 
subjectivity that inform this concept (as well as “the inhuman”) mandate this outcome, as 
these perceptions are made possible through the process of abjection. As a result,
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culturally present conceptions of “the human” and “the inhuman” are reproduced and 
legitimized through human rights.
The exclusivity of this legal process illustrates the inequality embedded “in the 
[legislative] formulations and definitions of humanity” (Balfour and Cavada 279). 
Because “the human” and “the inhuman” are consolidated through the law, one’s 
subjectivity or lack thereof is bound to the legal definition of this category and the 
(inability to claim rights via this classification. The inequity generated by this legislated 
subjectivity demonstrates that “to be a person you must be in the law, you must have 
rights” (Douzinas 39). Although these rights are premised on existing notions of 
subjectivity, they are requisite to the legal recognition of human being, and as such, are 
integral to one’s socio-political status as human. Accordingly, “a human being is 
someone who can successfully claim human rights,” as this ability affirms one’s position 
as a subject (Douzinas 45). Ian Balfour and Eduardo Gavada further note that because 
these rights are established by the state, one must be a citizen to access the legal 
validation and protection they provide. Consequently, one’s status as human is bound to 
one’s citizenship, and “when the continuity between the human and the citizen is broken 
down” (Balfour & Cavada 281), this status is lost, demonstrating that one is more or less 
human based on one’s recognition as a citizen (Douzinas 98). Accordingly, “the 
human,” and the rights that consolidate this notion, are contingent upon one’s citizenship, 
or rather the state regulation of subjectivity and identity. 3
3
Balfour and Cavadas, as well as Douzinas, paraphrase Hannah Arendt, who claims that “a man who is 
nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a man” 
(300). That is, once one’s civil status is lost, one is no longer recognized as human, which undermines the 
universality o f  this subject position and its accompanying rights.
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Douzinas argues that citizenship is bestowed “according to the criteria of blood 
and birth,” which indicates that this status is available to select individuals and confers a 
level of privilege within a given state (98). However, access,to citizenship is also 
dependent upon the various other factors that comprise contemporary subjectivity, which 
are used by the state to establish rights that confirm this understanding of humanity. 
Given the limited description of “the human” detailed in human rights, the implications 
of this relationship are broad, further indicating the inherent restrictions of humanity and 
citizenship as they are presently understood. Douzinas notes that civil rights have 
consistently been denied based on differences in race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality etc. 
(97), as these distinctions have been designated as inequalities to support the domination 
of the Western subject (54). Cognizant of this discrimination, various social movements 
have demanded the addition of these categories to the legal definition of “the human,” 
which has resulted in the ongoing civil rights tradition in North America (Douzinas 97).4 5
This activism has garnered significant success in expanding “the human” to include 
numerous different markers of identity; however, throughout this process, the primary ;
V
foundation of human ontology has remained intact, as Western law “only recognize[s] 
two biological sexes, male and female, accompanied by two matching gender identities 
and expressions (man/masculine, and woman/feminine)” (Rachlis & Smith 1 -  2). 
Accordingly, the ideology of gender binarism has been legislated, making “the human,” 
and subsequently the citizen, a gendered being according to the sex/gender paradigm.
4 E.g. the civil rights movement, the feminist movement, the gay and lesbian movement etc. (Valentine, 
Imagining 37).
5 Exceptions exist wherein certain jurisdictions legally recognize gender variant individuals in human 
rights legislation; however, this is not a standard practice across North America (Currah, Green, & Stryker 
9; Namaste, Sex Change 114).
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2. Legislated Inhumanity \ ^
Debbie Rachlis and Miriam Smith claim that this legal prescription of ontology 
has rendered the existence of gender variant individuals “impossible in the eyes of the 
law” (5), as those who “cross” or confound the gender binary are unintelligible according 
to the terms of citizenship. As gender diversity unsettles the foundation of the Western 
subject, it necessarily disrupts the legal categories that legitimize this understanding of 
subjectivity, such as sex, gender, and “the human,” which eliminates the possibility of 
representation under these terms. Rachlis and Smith claim that this state regulation of the 
sex/gender paradigm has effectively erased gender diverse persons from legal 
consideration, and argue that these individuals have experienced widespread 
discrimination as a result (29).6 Because the legislative understanding of “the human” 
cannot instantiate gender variance, numerous individuals are presently without rights, 
indicating that they fail to qualify as citizens. This lack of legal recourse thus affirms the 
perception of gender variant persons as inhuman; their absence in the law indicates they 
have “no right to marry, to work, to use a public bathroom, or even walk down the street 
in safety” (Thomas 311), which fortifies their cultural abjection. Nevertheless, state 
efforts exist to assimilate gender variance within the law according to the sex/gender 
paradigm to preserve the integrity of these categories. : .
In both Canada and the United States, the law requires that gender variant 
individuals have sex reassignment surgery [SRS] “in order to have their identities 
acknowledged, and their rights protected” (Darke & Cope 40; Thaler, Bermudez, &
6 Rachlis and Smith are largely influenced by Namaste’s argument that transsexual and transgender 
individuals are erased from the cultural and institutional world {Invisible 2).
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Sommer 142).7 Julie Darke and Allison Cope note that once this surgery is complete, one 
can amend the sex designation on various identification documents, such as birth 
certificates, passports, and landing papers, which confirms that one is a “legal” member 
of her/his chosen gender (3 9) .8 Gender variance is thus made to conform to thei
sex/gender paradigm through the state institutionalization of identity, indicating that one 
must be classifiable according to this system to qualify as a citizen, gain access to legal 
rights, and achieve recognition as human. However, to qualify for the mandatory surgery 
that facilitates this compliance, one must first be diagnosed with “gender identity 
disorder,” a condition that establishes one’s gender identity as a mental illness (Darke & 
Cope 39; Thaler, Bermudez, & Sommer 150). To be acknowledged within the law, the 
state not only requires that one undergo extensive surgery, but that one pathologize 
oneself to obtain access to these medical procedures. As such, one’s entitlement to legal 
recognition and protection is restricted unless one is classified as “sick” and is surgically 
modified to fit the confines of social norms.
Because the sex/gender paradigm designates the body as the site of cultural
\
subjectivity, it is unsurprising that the state “solution” to nonnormative gender mandates 
the pathologization and surgical alteration of gender variant bodies. As Young notes, 
bodies that are seen to fall outside the normative understanding of “human” embodiment 
are labeled aberrant and/or sick (Justice 123), which is confirmed by the legal 
enforcement of SRS and GID. Though these requirements function under the guise of
7
Although there are multiple different components involved in one’s physical transition, the law generally 
defines sex reassignment surgery as a double mastectomy and hysterectomy for transmen and vaginoplasty 
for transwomen (Darke & Cope 47).
As the only options for sex designation remain “female” or “male,” this “choice” o f  gender is still 
restricted to a binary model. Consequently, i f  one’s gender identity does not fall into either category, legal 
recognition is unavailable.
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assimilation, they are actually state processes of abjection; by mandating the 
pathologization and alteration of gender variant bodies, the state endeavours to eliminate 
the threat posed by nonnormative gender to legally sanctioned subjectivity, thereby 
confirming that gender variance is not allowed to “exist.”9 As such, the state enforcement 
of SRS and GID institutionally expels gender nonconformity from the realm of socio­
political viability to reconfirm the legitimized bounds of “the human.” These 
requirements consolidate the dehumanization of gender variance through the law, making 
this cultural status a legislated position. As a result, one must expel the culturally abjected 
parts of oneself through these mandated processes to become a legal subject, which 
reproduces the process of subject formation through the law. Of course, the abject can 
never be eliminated, as it forms the constitutive outside of the subject; therefore, these 
requirements merely indicate that “the human” is indeed a construct: something that must 
literally be made to preserve the ideological foundations that inform this concept.
Despite the legal acknowledgment that accompanies the medicalization and 
pathologization of one’s identity, these prerequisites indicate that gender variant
v
individuals can never fully access “the human.” Rather, these processes legally 
differentiate gender diverse persons from those who have already been granted human 
status and are subsequently perceived as legitimate human beings according to state 
standards. Consequently, the protection offered by this regulation of gender variance is 
relatively precarious; although the surgically modified body is recognized, the specificity 
of gender diverse identities cannot be accounted for by a binary system, which has
9 ^It is the state requirement to participate in these processes which functions as the legal manifestation o f
the cultural abjection o f  gender variance, not the desire to have surgery and/or the wish to seek
psychological services.
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resulted in the continued use of identity as the basis of discrimination (Rachlis & Smith 
3).10 As a result, the legal enforcement of SRS and GID cannot “fix” gender variance, 
thereby eliminating it as a threat, precisely because this mode of being has been culturally 
established as abject. Although gender variant bodies can be modified to “fit” the 
normative confines of “the human,” the ideology of gender binarism (specifically the 
biologism of this paradigm) maintains the abjection of nonnormative gender, indicating 
that gender variant persons cannot be “human” despite state efforts of 
assimilation/eradication. The necessity of GID reinforces this status, as this 
pathologization automatically locates these individuals outside the parameters of 
normative subjectivity. Furthermore, the limited protection provided by these state 
requirements indicates that these processes fail to establish gender variant persons as 
“human,” yet serve to distinguish between those who are “lawful” members of their 
chosen gender and those who do not have access to this status. Darke and Cope note that 
“[t]here are many people who cannot, or will not, have SRS and, therefore, will never be 
legally recognized as members of their gender” (47), which amplifies this cultural 
abjection.
For those who do not perceive their gender as binary and/or do not wish to alter 
their body, legal protection is simply unavailable. In addition, the numerous individuals 
who do not regard their identity as pathological are barred from obtaining SRS and the 
minimal rights that accompany this surgery (Darke & Cope 39). This legal status is 
further restricted, as those who are willing to undergo the medical scrutiny mandated by
10 Rachlis and Smith demonstrate that there have been several cases wherein a gender variant individual 
was recognized by the court as a “legal” member o f her/his chosen gender, yet discrimination was still 
permitted due to the plaintiffs gender variant identity/status (17).
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the state must endure a series of austere measures to acquire the diagnosis that precedes 
one’s access to citizenship (Darke & Cope 39).11 Moreover, the health care necessary to
;
12participate in this process is often inaccessible (Shelley 70), a diagnosis is not 
guaranteed, and the surgeries covered by the state vary according to jurisdiction (Darke & 
Cope 39 -  40). Each limitation indicates that one’s access to “the human” is embroiled in 
a network of efforts by the state to enforce the sex/gender paradigm through the various 
-x institutions that “police those who differ from social norms” (Stryker, History 150). 
Whether one is made to “fit” this system,1 23 is denied entry to this framework, or is 
invalidated by its premise, one’s rights are bound to the perception of “the human” as a 
“normatively” gendered being. ;
3. Transgender Human Rights
* Because the legal definition of humanity has barred gender variant individuals 
from intelligible citizenship, many have argued that rights must be procured to remedy 
the legislative erasure of gender diverse populations, thereby establishing gender 
nonconforming practices and persons as conceivable within the law.14 As rights confirm
11 “[I]t is extremely difficult...to obtain SRS. To have some surgeries covered...a gender clinic must 
confirm a diagnosis o f Gender Identity Disorder, rule out numerous other diagnoses and circumstances o f  a 
person’s life, and conclude that the person is likely to be “successful” [successful is often code for ‘pass’]  ̂
living in their gender. Prior to surgery, the person must transition and live in their felt gender for at least 
one year [without the aid o f hormones, making the transition far more difficult]... A person could pay 
privately for surgery but the costs are extremely high. For all these reasons, they majority o f.. .people who
wish to have SRS are not able to get it” (Darke & Cope 39; emphasis in original).
12 , , •
Shelly notes that despite Canada’s universal health care system; it is consistently inaccessible to low-
income residents, which is relevant to the gender variant population, as they experience high rates o f  
employment discrimination (69). Namaste makes a similar point with respect to both Canada and the 
United States, highlighting the relationship between stable employment and health care benefits (Sex 
Change 108). Both critiques demonstrate how the state works on multiple different levels to disenfranchise 
gender variant individuals (i.e. access to employment and health care determines one’s access to legal 
protection). ?
13 7 ■ ■
This critique is not directed at those who wish to modify their body and comply with state standards, but 
is rather targeted at the multiple restrictions that these standards impose.
14 See Broadus 99; Currah 24; Currah, Green, & Stryker 20; Thomas 321.
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one’s status as human, the legal recognition of gender variance would verify the 
humanity of gender diverse persons, thus contesting the inhuman status they have been 
attributed in Western culture. Efforts to achieve this legal standing in North America 
have taken shape as the “transgender rights” movement, which has been largely
influenced by the “language, precedents, and models” provided by the various civil rights
/
movements that have preceded it (Valentine, Imagining 37). Currah notes this form of 
activism obtained rights for its constituents based on the notion of collective identity, 
which introduced identity politics as the framework through which individuals establish 
civil rights and thus gain legal access to “the human” (14). As a result, these movements 
have demonstrated that “the assertion of rights [is] a way of intervening into the social 
and political process by which the human is articulated” (Butler, Undoing 33), a tactic 
that the transgender rights movement has taken up by using the label under which it is 
organized to make claims on behalf of gender variant individuals. Although 
“transgender” remains a contested term due to the various understandings of this
signifier, contemporary transgender politics deploys this label as an umbrella term as well
\
as an identity category to obtain legal recognition for its manifold constituents (Currah 
22). By exploiting the cultural and legal intelligibility of identity politics, this movement 
situates itself within a civil rights tradition while attempting to instantiate various forms 
of gender diversity. :
Though human rights are integral to one’s political viability, several authors have 
noted the shortcomings of utilizing a rights framework to address the abjection and 
erasure of gender variant individuals in Western culture. Some claim that an exclusive 
concentration on rights will generate minimal results, as this strategy fails to challenge
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the various state structures that perpetuate inequality (Currah, Green, & Strkyer 9; 
Namaste, Sex Change 10). Others completely reject a rights framework, arguing that the 
legal instantiation of gender variance will not resolve the state regulation of gender 
diverse identities, and as such, will only benefit those who are willing and able to comply 
with these standards (Namaste, Sex Change 25 -  26). Many have also noted that the use 
of identity politics risks homogenizing as well as excluding the various constituents of 
the transgender movement despite the plurality this label suggests, which calls into 
question the benefit of procuring rights under this category (Currah 6). According to 
Thomas, “human rights.. .are never enough” (323), as the complex issues that accompany 
the cultural definition of (in)humanity cannot be solved strictly through the law, 
particularly given the restrictions imposed by this state mechanism of control.
Nevertheless, one must have rights to be human, and as these rights are based on a 
particular understanding of humanity, those located outside this framework must 
necessarily change the definition of “the human” to obtain recognition as citizens, gain 
access to legal protection, and subsequently confirm their humanity. Thus, what seems to 
be a matter of terminology actually generates ontological effects that can “radically 
change the constitution of the legal subject and affect people’s lives” (Douzinas 56). The 
impact of previous civil rights movements illustrates one potential outcome of this 
process, as their success has affirmed the citizenship of those formerly excluded from the 
legal scope of human being. Given these results, transgender rights advocates continue to 
ground their activism in a human rights framework despite the possible limitations of this 
approach. By emphasizing the human aspect of these rights, activists not only 
demonstrate that gender diverse individuals “are human beings deserving common
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respect and dignity” (Currah, Green, & Stryker 12), they seek to establish gender 
variance as ontologically possible through the prescription of the law. Though obtaining 
civil rights is only one measure used to remedy the abjection of gender diversity, this 
struggle cannot be overcome without addressing the need for legal instantiation.
The continued efforts of civil rights activists to incorporate various identity 
categories into human rights legislation indicates that the ostensible universality of “the 
human” has had to become increasingly more particular to resemble the widespread 
applicability this concept suggests. This modification confirms that notions of humanity 
are embedded in cultural ideology, as opposed to intrinsic qualities, and as such, are 
historically and culturally situated, yet are open to redefinition. Although this revision is 
necessary to obtain legal recognition for those situated outside the bounds of “the 
human,” Douzinas claims, “adding a new right or right-bearer to the existing group does 
not eliminate exclusion; it only alters its shape and scope” (97). Despite the ontological 
consequences that result from expanding “the human,” the primary foundation of this
concept is supplemented rather than altered by the various subcategories added to its
\
definition. Though individuals have obtained rights, recognition, and access to “the
human” through this process, this inclusion has also generated different “tiers” of
humanity that have had a minoritizing effect. Douzinas states,
[a] rights-claim typically requests the admission of the claimant to the position of 
the [legal] subject...[T]his action... reinforces rather than challenges the 
established ways...by accepting] the established power and distribution orders 
and aims to admit the new claimant in a peripheral position in them. (107)
As such, the initial model of “the human” is retained through this process; though it has
been amended to include various identity categories, these additions bolster the
predominant framework of “the human” by supplementing it, which indicates they
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occupy a secondary position. Consequently, the rights achieved by way of inclusion 
“have become rewards for accepting the dominant order” (Douzinas 108), and those 
unable to conform are subsequently barred from legal recognition and protection.
Although civil rights activism remains the principle mode of obtaining access to 
“the human,” transgender rights advocates have noted the marginalizing effects of 
utilizing this label as an identity category in addition to the other obstacles posed by this 
strategy . Currah, Jamison Green, and Stryker argue that the construction of “transgender” 
as a “type” of person not only reifies the assumed gender normativity of other identity 
categories by containing gender diversity, it reinforces the perception of “transgender 
people” as a minority group whose claims are seen as requests for special 
accommodation rather than access to basic human rights (5).15 By attempting to resolve 
oppressive cultural discourses with individualized remedies, issues such as sexism and 
heterosexism are easily translated as the niche concerns of what is perceived as a 
relatively small and marginal demographic. However, the profound challenge transgender 
rights activists pose “to the traditional legal assumptions of sex/gender” complicate the 
very plausibility of this limited strategy (Rachlis & Smith 30). Given that gender variance 
undermines the foundation of human subjectivity, gender diversity cannot be made to fit 
the confines of “the human” without resignifying its premise or erasing the specificity of 
nonnormative gender. As the abject cannot be assimilated or destroyed, the only options 
are to expel it (signaled by the legislative absence of gender variance as well as mandated 
processes such as GID and SRS) or give way to the threat it represents. The actual
15 Carol Bacchi notes that this outcome is a standard pitfall o f identity politics; the social inequity present 
in current conceptions o f “the human” are overlooked, as those seeking access to this category are 
identified as “the problem” (128 -  146).
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instantiation of gender variant individuals within the parameters of the law thus requires a 
radical reconceptualization of legal ontology due to the abjection of gender diversity. 
Aware of this fact, and the various other pitfalls of identity politics, transgender activists 
have begun “rethinking the ‘human’ in human rights around the axis of the ‘inhuman’” 
(Thomas 322).
4. Resignifying “The Human”
Despite the ongoing commitment to gain access to the law, Currah claims that the 
transgender rights movement is working to legally transform the gender norms that 
presently bar gender variant individuals from legislative protection (23). Rather than 
attempting to conform to these standards, activists are seeking legal recognition through 
their endeavour “to change the commonsense truths about gender...in as many ways and 
in as many venues as possible” (Currah 20). Thomas describes this tactic as an effort to 
put “the notion of the ‘inhuman’ to potentially positive use” by exploiting the disruptive 
power of this concept to achieve political and legislative gains (316). Instead of 
minimizing the ontological crisis gender variance represents, advocates utilize this 
disturbance to expose the faulty premise of human being, as well as the exclusivity of its 
legal instantiation. However, by continuing to locate transgender rights under the rubric 
of human rights, this strategy not only exposes the limitations of “the human,” it 
consciously endeavours to redefine the terms of intelligible citizenship. As such, 
transgender politics seeks to resignify the legal prescription of human ontology rather 
than merely expand its scope by harnessing the abjection of gender variance as a political 
tool. Though Currah notes that legal recognition is more difficult to achieve when 
opposing hegemonic norms (20), Thomas claims that this approach is vital, as the simple
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inclusion into the existing framework of “the human” “runs the risk of entrenching the 
rigid, repressive ideas about humanity and inhumanity from which [gender variant] 
people are fighting to be free” (314). The current attempt to assimilate gender diversity 
within the law according to the sex/gender paradigm indicates that the actual 
representation of gender variance is ultimately impossible while this system is still in
i
place. Consequently, the rights of gender variant individuals are contingent upon the 
elimination of “any legally prescribed relationship between biological sex, gender 
identity, and gender expression” (Currah 23), which mandates that “the human” be 
transformed. : ^
To achieve this legislative revision, transgender activists are presently “working 
to end the use of gender norms as a criterion in distributing rights and resources, 
including jobs, housing, health care, and the limited social services that do exist” (Currah 
7). Their objective is to terminate the state’s authority to enforce the sex/gender paradigm 
by policing the relationship between one’s legally assigned sex and one’s gender identity 
and expression (Currah 24). By removing the legislative requirement to conform to a 
normative gender framework, one’s access to citizenship, rights, and “equal participation 
in the public sphere” are no longer restricted according to the cultural intelligibility of 
one’s gender (Thomas 321). Thomas claims that this goal not only demands that the state 
discontinue its use of the law to mandate a particular form of gendered being, it calls 
upon the state to ensure the right to gender self-determination and the freedom of gender 
expression (321). Currah, Green, and Stryker note that these entitlements require that 
“(a).. .individuals whose gender identity or gender expression is not traditionally 
associated with their birth sex should not be denied any rights or resources because of
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that difference, and (b) that one’s subjectively perceived gender identity (not one’s birth 
sex) determines one’s legal gender” (21). Both rights work together to disestablish the 
relation between the legislative interpretation of sex and gender while acknowledging 
gender diversity as a legitimate practice worthy of state protection.
Though gender remains a legal category according to these entitlements, its 
manifestation would no longer be regulated by the state, as the right to self-determination 
would replace sex as the foundation of gendered human being. This amendment entails a 
radical resignification of human ontology within the law, as the biologism that presently 
informs the sex/gender paradigm would become legislatively obsolete. Furthermore, the
i
freedom of gender expression would eradicate the two-gender model that presently 
prohibits the legal recognition of those who do not fall into either category. Each right 
works in tandem to dismantle the current influence sex has on the organization and 
regulation of human being, which suggests that this category may lose its political 
relevance. The implications of this change would extend far beyond “transgender 
grievances” (Currah, Green, & Stryker 8), indicating that the objectives of the
\
transgender rights movement are fundamentally bound to the project of redefining “the 
human,” as opposed to supplementing an existing paradigm with an additional identity 
category.16 By severing the legislated unity between sex and gender, transgender activists
16 These implications would necessarily include the dismantling o f  patriarchal gender structures, as the 
sex/gender paradigm informs these discriminatory practices. As Rachlis and Smith note, transgender rights 
activism has built upon the feminist politicization o f  gender and the debate regarding biological 
essentialism in relation to this category (29), which suggests a potential alignment o f these movements 
against sexist norms. Yet, these authors also note that “[t]he adoption o f  a more fluid approach to the legal 
definition o f sex, gender and gender identity creates the possibility o f  conflict between trans rights and a 
feminist politics that calls upon a universal female experience as the basis o f  collective identity and 
equality rights claims” (15). Because transgender rights fundamentally challenge present legal assumptions 
regarding sex and gender, claims based on these assumptions with respect to cissexual women may be 
viewed as jeopardized by the right to gender self-determination and freedom o f gender expression.
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seek to increase the scope of livable lives rather than moderately expand an existing 
framework. Thomas claims that the effects generated by this strategy establish the 
objectives of the transgender rights movement as “a species of democratic 
‘destabilization rights’” with the potential to uproot discriminatory cultural practices 
embedded in Western law (321). However, given the present limitations imposed by “the 
human” and the continued prevalence of identity politics, how are these legislative goals 
to be achieved?
In both Canada and the United States, transgender rights activists have called for 
the incorporation of “gender identity” and/or “gender expression” as protected grounds in 
existing human rights legislation (Currah 21; Currah, Green, & Stryker 7; Rachlis & 
Smith 18). Though advocates continue to employ a rights framework, their claims are 
positioned outside the context of identity politics, as neither gender identity nor gender 
expression refer to a particular group of beneficiaries. Accordingly, the objective of this 
strategy is to remove the legal restrictions imposed by the sex/gender paradigm rather
than create “a new category of a protected class” (Currah 6). Currah, Green, and Stryker
\
note that any attempt to legally instantiate gender variance has the double task of 
explicitly protecting gender diverse individuals while employing language flexible 
enough to ensure that the full range of nonnormative gender identities and practices 
receive this protection (15). The inclusion of gender identity and/or gender expression in 
human rights legislation is an effort to achieve this task, as these categories are perceived 
as offering the most protections to the largest number of people without referring to a
However, as these rights do not mandate the elimination o f  conventional gender identities, the 
destabilization o f “women’s human rights” is not the necessary outcome o f  transgender rights.
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particular “tyPe” ° f  person to represent all gender variant individuals (Rachlis & Smith 
19). Rachlis and Smith further argue that these categories are capable of accounting for 
the specificity of gender diversity since they do not reflect nor mandate a binary 
understanding of gender, which “allows for the recognition of a multiplicity of gender 
identities on the basis of self-identification, all of which would be protected under the 
law” (19 -  20). This outcome would thus facilitate the legal transformation required to 
ensure the right to gender self-determination and the freedom of gender expression, 
which would negate the present restrictions imposed by the legislation of the sex/gender 
paradigm. However, to effect these changes one must gain access to the law, which 
requires the creation of an identity category for the purposes of legal recognition. This 
obstacle has resulted in the provisional use of “transgender” as an identity to make rights 
claims outside of this framework. ^
As transgender activists continue to protest the enforcement of the sex/gender 
paradigm, Currah notes that they have strategically employed the language of identity to
position their arguments in terms intelligible to the state (24). Although the goal of this
\
movement is not to contain gender variance within a “neat and circumscribed” category 
(Currah 24), Butler observes that we must “present ourselves as bounded beings,” able to■ ' 'U
use the language of law and culture if we are to secure legal rights and protections 
{Undoing 20). Consequently, advocates have portrayed the various constituents of gender 
diverse communities as members of a particular social group to establish “transgender” as 
a term of collective identity, while also aiming to transcend these politics. By utilizing 
“transgender” as an identity category, these activists are able to translate their claims 
within the parameters of the law, which affords them the recognition required to obtain
access to this system and make changes from within. However, these advocates have not 
incorporated “transgender” into the legal amendments they are struggling to achieve, 
despite organizing themselves under this label (Currah 23). This strategy not only allows 
this movement to ultimately circumvent the pitfalls of identity politics, it presents the 
opportunity to reconfigure “the human” in legislative terms. By exploiting “transgender” 
as an identity only to substitute this label with categories such as “gender identity” and 
“gender expression,” transgender activists create the opportunity to alter, rather than 
supplement, the legal perception of gender and subsequently human ontology. Currah 
claims that this approach establishes transgender rights activism “as an identity politics 
movement that seeks the dissolution of the very category under which it is organized” 
(24). Though the language of identity is employed, the confines of this label are 
invariably undermined by the legal obj ectives this movement seeks to obtain.
5. Possibilities and Effects
While transgender activists continue to utilize a rights framework and exploit the 
intelligibility of identity politics, their use of “nonidentitarian” language in the
V
amendments they are seeking facilitates their efforts to achieve an ontological paradigm 
shift within the law that surmounts the limitations of identity. The demand to include 
gender identity, and/or expression in human rights legislation to ensure the right to gender 
self-determination and freedom of gender expression indicates that these activists’
l
intentions do not involve the legal instantiation of gender diversity “within slightly 
expanded yet sill-normative gender constructions and arrangements” (Currah 24). Instead 
of endorsing a category that ultimately preserves the dichotomy between normative and 
diverse gender identities and expressions, these efforts attempt to alter conventional,
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perceptions of what it is to be gendered, and thus what it is to be human, through the law. 
Both Currah (23) and Thomas (321) note that this legislative resignification of ontology 
necessarily impacts all persons, rather than just those who are striving to achieve this 
reconfiguration, as we are all currently regulated by the rules and restrictions of the 
sex/gender paradigm. In turn, the amendments proposed by these activists would offer 
protections to persons of all genders rather than individualizing the manifold oppressions 
brought about by the two-gender system (Thomas 321). Thomas claims that this 
protection would equally extend to those who do not perceive themselves as gendered, as 
the right to self-determination would invariably include the right to indétermination 
(321). This widespread recognition indicates that transgender rights activism does not call 
for the abolition of gender assignment, but rather demands that “the regime of 
compulsory gender” be dismantled (Thomas 321; emphasis in original). Accordingly, 
gender would retain its legal intelligibility to deter discrimination on this ground, yet 
would no longer be required to access citizenship, rights, and “the human.” As such, 
these legislative amendments would create new possibilities for politically viable 
subjectivity.
A prospective outcome of this extensive legal protection would be the dissolution 
of (non)normative understandings of gender. Because all gender expressions and 
identities would be acknowledged as equally valid, the binarism that informs the 
separation of traditional and unconventional gender would no longer be required for legal 
instantiation, and may thus become politically and culturally obsolete. As a result, the 
duality that presently grounds the legal understanding of gendered being could potentially 
be replaced by a continuum capable of recognizing all forms of gender (Currah 6). This
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alternate perspective would establish gender variability as a legislative norm without 
necessitating the legal categorization of each identity and expression as a prerequisite for 
citizenship. Again, gender would maintain its position as a legislative category, yet would 
no longer be bound to a legally prescribed framework used to determine one’s status as 
human.17 This new perception of legal ontology would eliminate many of the concerns 
enumerated by transgender activists, such as the existing requirements regarding SRS, the 
homogenization and exclusivity of identity politics,18 and the current dehumanization of 
those who cannot be accounted for by the sex/gender paradigm. Without the need for 
binary distinctions to determine the validity of one’s gender, the identities and practices 
of gender diverse individuals become viable expressions of gendered human being.
Thomas claims that this transformation not only entails “the democratization of 
existing gender relations” (320), it signals “the pluralization of the possibilities of gender 
itself’ (320). By replacing the sex/gender paradigm with a continuum, femininity and 
masculinity are released from the oppositional hierarchy that previously defined these
expressions, while other modes of gender are made possible in the law. As Serano states,
\
“if we could push our culture to move beyond the idea that female and male are rigid, 
mutually exclusive ‘opposite sexes,’ that would make the lives of all transgender 
constituent subgroups far easier” (351). What is imperative to note is that this 
development does not call for the eradication of conventional gender identities in favour
17 It has been argued that the recognition o f gender as a continuum gestures towards the dissolution o f this 
concept as a publicly meaningful category (Thomas 322). However, the elimination o f  gender as a cultural 
concept, and subsequently a legal classification, would not only create an anti-gender politics that would 
exclude numerous individuals, it would fundamentally invalidate anyone who perceives their identity and 
subjectivity through this lens, which is not the objective o f  this politics. Rather, transgender rights attempt
to position gender as a category through which subjectivity is enabled, not limited.
18 This effect should be viewed as pertaining to identity politics that concern gender, as opposed to all 
identity politics. * *
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of.gender diversity, but rather implies the potential coexistence of all genders by 
nullifying the duality of the two-gender system. Although transgender activists seek to 
establish gender variability as an ontological paradigm, the objective is not to replace one 
exclusive framework with another (Currah 24), but to increase the scope of livable lives 
by eliminating the binarism required to establish one’s political and cultural viability. 
Accordingly, the legal instantiation of gender variability would sever conventional 
gender from the essentialist dichotomy that presently determines its cultural value, yet 
would not render femininity and masculinity obsolete.19 Many authors have argued that 
the right to gender freedom and self-determination would be significantly compromised 
were these expressions to be “outlawed,” claiming that this exclusion would merely 
invert the binarism activists seek to displace through a “transnormative” lens. Thus, to 
achieve the desired effects of these proposed legislative amendments, traditional gender 
identities must be retained as viable possibilities on the gender continuum, though they 
will no longer be mandated nor positioned as oppositional.
Without a normative framework to establish a hegemonic mode of gender, the
( x
notion of conventional and diverse gender expression would dissipate in the law, 
allowing for the potential coexistence of these identities and practices. Because each 
manifestation would be recognized as valid, their opposition would be neutralized and
J
their ability to negate one another would be extinguished. Accordingly, the elimination of 
binarism as the foundation of gendered being allows for the pluralization of gender, as *20
Though one could argue that the polarity and biologism that presently informs these expressions cannot 
be removed from these concepts without eradicating their meaning, authors have argued that it is possible 
to retain these gendered attributes and identities while releasing them from the sex/gender paradigm given
the constructed nature o f  this system (Califia 275; Thomas 320).
20 I.e. by establishing gender variant identities as normative, gender binarism would be inverted and 
reproduced. See Califia 275, Currah 23 - 24, Serano 349, Thomas 320 -  321.
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this concept is no longer based on a model of exclusion. However, as Ñamaste claims, 
“[i]t is too easy.. .to make a pluralist argument in which we must respect all.. .identities” 
(Sex Change 21). Though her comment directly refers to the ever-expanding list of 
gender variant persons subsumed by the “transgender umbrella,” her concern marks the 
erasure of specificity, particularly with respect to lived experience and subjectivity (Sex 
Change 21). Ñamaste’s critique emphasizes the potential lack of substance that 
accompanies what may be an oversimplified solution to the problem of duality; yet, 
transgender rights activists make clear that the pluralization of gender is an effect, not a 
cause, of the paradigm shift required to make this heterogeneity possible. Without this 
resignification, gender pluralism would reflect a model of inclusion that requires 
accommodation by an existing paradigm unable to account for the specificity of gender 
variance. Subsequently, the objective of legislating gender variability does not entail the 
mere prescription of plurality, but rather the ontological change required to recognize 
gender pluralism as a possibility without imposing it as a legal standard. By situating 
gender outside a binary framework without mandating how this concept will manifest,
V
gender variability not only recognizes the specificity of gendered being, it establishes this 
distinctiveness as the foundation of legal ontology.
Because gender variability can acknowledge all forms of gender without 
legislating their substance or scope, this concept allows a certain ontological “flexibility” 
within the law that is capable of adapting to changing notions of gendered being. Rather 
than imposing a universal model of humanity, variability does not instantiate a paradigm 
that can be comprehensibly applied, but instead recognizes that “the human” is in a 
“constant process of change,” which must be acknowledged by the law (Balfour and
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Cadava 284). This perception of ontology not only eliminates binarism, it displaces the
monolithic legal subject with the possibility of variegated forms of subjectivity. As
Douzinas claims, “the idea that the essence of humanity is to be found in a human cipher
lacking the characteristics that make each person a unique being is bizarre” (53).
Accordingly, it is our differences, or the substantive qualities that determine the lived
experience of subjectivity, that comprise our humanity (Douzinas 53); nevertheless, the
current understanding of “the human” has positioned these distinctions as inequalities, or
more recently, lesser modes of human being that require state accommodation. While this
conception of humanity has maintained the dominance of the “universal subject,” the
legal instantiation of gender variability would work to unmoor difference as the
foundation of inequity by establishing this diversity as the basis of subjectivity. By
grounding “the human” upon the specificity of gendered being according to its manifold
expressions, this conception of ontology would exemplify how a “proliferation of
differences” could serve as the basis of intelligible personhood while the notion of “the
1
human” continued to be developed and redefined. This paradigm shift again 
demonstrates how the objectives of transgender rights activists are likely to increase the 
livability of numerous lives by setting a precedent for a more comprehensive notion of
human being. By eliminating the need for binarism, these advocates propose a plausible
r
ontology where to be human no longer requires the dehumanization of others.
The goal of resignifying the premise of “the human” indicates that transgender 
rights activism unites its constituents according to the political objectives of this 
movement, as opposed to a shared identity or particular expression of gender. Although 21
21 See Chapter Two for a detailed explanation o f  Toffoletti’s claim that a “proliferation o f  differences” can 
replace binarism as the primary model o f  human being.
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gender variance is the primary framework through which these politics are conveyed, the 
ramifications of these legislative amendments indicate that the immediate goals of this 
movement entail far-reaching modifications that supersede the initial aim to legally 
protect gender diverse individuals. Because all genders are recognized and validated by 
the concept of gender variability, these activists establish the foundation for a coalitional 
movement despite their continued use of “transgender” to achieve preliminary legal 
intelligibility and access to human rights discourse. As Currah, Greenland Stryker note, 
“[o]ne of the most fruitful approaches to transgender rights involves moving beyond the 
identity politics model and working in coalition to address issues not based on identity 
categories” (18). By using nonidentitarian language to promote such concepts as a gender 
continuum,22 the right to gender self-determination, and the freedom of gender 
expression, advocates emphasize the wide-ranging effects of these amendments, as 
opposed to highlighting the rights of a specific community. As these objectives are 
situated outside an identity politics framework, (which would position these goals as 
“transgender” issues), activists are able to demonstrate how manifold individuals are
V
presently affected by the restrictions of the sex/gender paradigm, the limited conception 
of “the human,” and how there is a widespread interest and benefit in dismantling these 
notions in the law. Accordingly, this activism calls for a coalitional effort to extend 
transgender politics beyond the confines of this label in the name of a more just 
conception of humanity. Though activists are still required to establish an identity 
category by the state, these legislative amendments suggests a possible future wherein 
individuals may not have to deploy the language of identity to gain access to rights.
22 The nonidentitarian language referred to is the proposed incorporation o f gender identity and gender 
expression into existing human rights legislation.
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Although notions of human subjectivity cannot be changed solely through ■ 
legislative revision, the assertion of rights in the struggle to achieve personhood is one 
way in which this concept can be redefined (Butler, Undoing 32 -  33). By claiming civil 
rights, one creates the possibility of legally impacting the process through which “the 
human” is defined, indicating that these assertions generate ontological effects. This 
ability indicates that concepts of humanity are not grounded in “some timeless, 
transcendental essence” shared by those who qualify as “human” (Balfour & Cadava 
284), but are rather founded upon historical-cultural perceptions of viable being, which 
change across time and space. As such, “the human” is not only open to resignification, it 
is in a constant process of rearticulation that is furthered by the continued assertion and 
creation of new rights. Though present conceptions of humanity demand conformity to a 
model that prohibits numerous expressions of subjectivity, the reification of the 
“universal subject” can potentially be overcome with rights that change in tandem 
according to new notions of humanity (Balfour & Cavada 284).
The legal instantiation of gender variability exemplifies one instance of this legal 
flexibility, as it enables the substantive representation of various modes of gendered 
being as they continue to develop and change. Because this amendment would displace 
binarism as the foundation of legal subjectivity, a more comprehensive understanding of 
“the human” would be created in the law that could potentially expand to other areas of 
ontology, offering a more just perception of human being. By “changing as the conditions 
of what counts as human.. .change” (Balfour & Cavada 284), rights become responsive to 
the various manifestations of subjectivity, as opposed to outlawing this versatility by 
legislating the form ontology must take. As such, rights must also be in a continual
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process of revision (Balfour & Cadava 280), not only to reflect the changing concept of 
“the human,” but to ensure the protection of as many people as possible “in the name of a 
more capacious and finally, less violent world” (Butler, Undoing 35). By 
reconceptualizing “the human” through the lens of human rights, each concept is 
redefined to increase the scope of livable lives.
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